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Pennsylvania Class Actions: the Future
in Light of Recent Restrictions
on Federal Access?
VICTOR R. DELLE DONNE
ROBERT 0. VAN HORN
Authors' Note: During the course of publication of this arti-
le, two extremely important decisions have been handed down.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974), the Supreme
Court, by mandating stringent adherence to the literal notice re-
quirements of Federal Rule 23 and restricting the discretion of the
trial judge, has severely emasculated the federal class action. As
such, our assertions herein, regarding the federal action's decline,
are further substantiated.
We contend further that this decline will mean a marked
increase in the use of our state courts as class suit forums.
Quite recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized the
need for clarification of the Pennsylvania law in this area. Mc-
Mononagle v. Allstate Insurance Co., 227 Pa. Super. 205 (1974).
That four of six participating judges felt compelled to enter sep-
arate opinions is further evidence that the class action imbroglio
stands ripe for authoritative resolution by our supreme court. Al-
locatur has been granted.
I. INTRODUCTION
The class action in its role as a legal device has received mixed
reviews. On the one hand, proponents hail it as "one of the most
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useful social remedies in history"' and view it as the main remedial
refuge for the everyday man in an ever-encroaching legal world.2
Antagonists, on the other hand, vilify the class action as a "Frank-
enstein monster,"' as an "engine of destruction,"4 and single it out
as the means by which federal courtrooms have been transmogri-
fied into forums for "legalized blackmail."5  As is often the case,
the truth of the matter seems to lie somewhere in the expanse be-
tween extremes. The controversy in this area of law is a continu-
ing one. And if the range of uses for the class action device pro-
ceeds to expand as it has of late,6 it is unlikely that this contro-
versy will soon abate.
Certainly, the class action device is deserving of wide-spread
study and attention. The nearly emotional response of jurists,
practitioners and commentators alike to its use is not surprising
since, conceptually at least, it is a legal remedy suited to the times.
Many of today's legal wrongs have a mass-production characteris-
tic; 7 and the class action is the result of an effort to provide a
mass production remedy.8 At first glance, it appears as almost the
antithesis of the profession's time-honored, reflexive habit of in-
dividualizing, of considering, reacting to and breaking down all le-
gal conflicts to "A v. B."9 To the contrary, though, the class action
is simply a reflection of the law's natural evolution in response to
changing times. As they must today, the A's and B's now fre-
quently represent groups of individuals suffering or perpetrating
group harm rather than lone individuals individually harmed or
harming. Admittedly, the magnitude of class actions in terms of
1. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death
Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. L. 1259 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 501 (1969); Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969); Weinstein, Revision of Pro-
cedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BuFF. L. REv. 460 (1960).
3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Lumbard, C.J., dissenting opinion).
4. See Simon, Class Actions: Useful Tool or Engines of Destruction,
55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
5. Handler, The Shift from Substantive To Procedural Innovations
in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71
COLuM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).
6. Counsel's ingenuity rather than his legal perspicacity may often
be the source for such expansion. See Katrincic & McLain, Federal Class
Actions Under Rule 23: How to Improve the Merits of Your Action With-
out Improving the Merits of Your Claim, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 429 (1972).
7. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substan-
tive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 309 (1973).
8. Id. at 308.
9. Id. at 309.
numbers of participants,'0 amounts of money'1 and time12 involved,
and breadth of issues'3 raised can be staggering. Along these
lines, it has been suggested that "[t]hinking of 'class' legal prob-
lems is a disconcerting . . . responsibility"' 4 for the traditionally
trained legal mind. Even if this is so, our legal system is duty
bound to rise to the task. Two early supporters of the class action
device expressed it well:
Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to
such group injuries for which individually they are in a
poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do
not know enough or because such redress is dispropor-
tionately expensive. If each is left to assert his rights
alone if and when he can, there will at least be a ran-
dom and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all.
This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case,
but it will operate seriously to impair the deterrent effect
of the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law.
The problem of fashioning an effective and inclusive group
remedy is thus a major one.
15
For the most part, the development of the class action qua
group remedy has been exclusively the province of the federal
courts. This federal "monopoly" on class actions has not occurred
by statutory or court delivered dictate. Instead, it seems to have
developed, sua sponte by reason of the nature and scope of the
issues raised and the encouraging and flexible treatment afforded
the device by the federal judiciary'
6 and procedural rulemakers.' 7
10. See, e.g., Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374,
97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971) (7 million plus).
11. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Cotler Drugs,
Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (37,000,000).
12. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Eisen III), cert. granted, U.S. (19 ) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S.
Oct. 16, 1973)), dismissing class action and vacating mini-hearing, 54
F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modifying 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), re-
manded from, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II,), rev'g, 41 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Eisen I), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 370 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). This case, now in its
eighth year, is still at the preliminary stages of court determination as
to its suitability as a class action.
13. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17
(D.D.C. 1971) (consumer); Mattingly v. Elias, 325 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (landlord-tenant); Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 319 F.
Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (education).
14. See Hazard supra note 7, at 308.
15. Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REv. 684, 686 (1941). See also Homburger, State Class
Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 641-42 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
17. See generally, Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Adv.
Com. Note]; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966




However, recent restrictions as to class actions in the federal
forum 18 and the expanding number of alternative federal proce-
dures for complex litigation19 suggest that an increasing number
of purported class representatives will have to turn to state courts
if they wish to proceed.
In Pennsylvania, that prospect is not an encouraging one
either for the class representative, his attorney or the courts. A
present need for re-examination of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 2230,20 which governs class actions, is indicated by this
probable increase in the use of our state courts as class action
forums. Moreover, a paucity of cases 21 and the abbreviated lan-
guage of Rule 223022 reflect the sparse and inconclusive state of
Pennsylvania class action law. And the need for re-examination is
further underscored by the fact that Rule 2230 is expressly de-
rived 23 from old Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2324 which was re-
18. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int'l. Paper Co., U.S. , 42 U.S.L.W. 4087
(U.S. Dec. 18, 1972); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S.
(1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) ).
19. See notes 245-48 and accompanying text infra.
20. PA. R. Crv. P. 2230 (Class Actions):
(a) if persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to join all as parties, any one or more of
them who will adequately represent the interest of all may sue or
be sued on behalf of all, but the judgment entered in such action
shall not impose personal liability upon anyone not a party
thereto.
Note: This subdivision adopts the practice under Pennsyl-
vania Equity Rule 16 and F.R.C.P. No. 23(a), 28 U.S.C.A., in
providing for a class suit where the members of a class are so
numerous as to make it impractical to join all parties.
Suits by or against unincorporated associations are not
to be brought as class suits under this Rule. Such suits are
now regulated by Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 2152 and 2153.
(b) An action brought on behalf of a class shall not be
dismissed discontinued, or compromised nor shall a voluntary
non-suit be entered therein without the approval of the court in
which the action is pending. Adopted June 7, 1940. Eff. Feb. 5,
1941.
Note: This provision is adapted from F.R.C.P. No. 23(c),
28 U.S.C.A. Since the parties acting on behalf of the class
represent and affect the class interests there should be some
limitation imposed which will insure that any dismissal or
compromise will be in the interests of the class.
[hereinafter Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure will be cited as P.R.
C.P.-].
21. See Section III infra.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Rules Committee Note, P.R.C.P. 2230.
24. FED. R. CiV. P. 23, U.S. ( ) [hereinafter cited as Original
Rule 23] provided:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so nu-
merous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate
written and completely altered in 1966.25 At present, then, it is
representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a mem-
ber of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication
of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in
the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
(b) Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought
to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more sharehold-
ers in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the
association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be as-
serted by it, a complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver
(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transac-
tion of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved
on him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not a col-
lusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction
of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction.
The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts
of thc plaintiff to seorrp from the managing directors or trustees
and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires,
and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons
for not making such effort.
(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court. If the
right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in para-
graphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only
if the court requires it.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 [hereinafter cited as Amended Rule 23] pro-
vides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-
tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individ-
ual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually control-
ling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
Pennsylvania Class Actions
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unclear whether Pennsylvania courts are or should be operating
with reference to old Federal Rule 23, new Federal Rule 23, neither
or both. Certainly then, it is time for a clear statement from our
supreme court or a revision or reaffirmation of Rule 2230 itself.
It is our premise herein that Rule 2230 is in need of immediate
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be
Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as
Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an ac-
tion brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a spcecified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not re-
quest exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favor-
able to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to
be a member of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B)
a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated
as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions
to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the ac-
tion, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct
to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair
and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or oth-
erwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to rep-
resentation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accord-
ingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be al-
tered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
and thoroughgoing revision. In that context, it is well to consider
the federal experience, both before and after the 1966 amendments
to Rule 23, in addition to an examination of the actual Pennsylvania
law under Rule 2230. As such, this Comment begins with a survey
of the federal class action. This is not meant to be an exhaustive
study. The literature and case law abound with extensive discus-
sions of virtually every general and specific topic in the area.26
Here the aim is to be complete and yet, to some extent, intention-
ally superficial. This section includes a brief review of the pre-
1966 federal experience and a sampling of some problem areas in
the post-1966 era. Section II also discusses the aforementioned cur-
tailments of federal forum availability for class actions which seem
to presage the increasingly frequent appearance of class actions in
our state courts. Section III includes a detailed treatment of the
entire body of significant Pennsylvania case law to date as it re-
lates to all aspects of the class action from drafting the initial
pleadings to the effect of the final judgment. In Section IV, a pro-
posal for amendments to Rule 2230 is offered.
If. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH CLASS ACTIONS
A. History and Development: Pre-1966
Class actions originated in the English equity system through
the device known as the bill of peace. 27 Moore suggests that this
development was a matter of necessity.28 The chancery courts of
that day required all persons naturally interested in the litigation
at hand be joined as parties. 29 However, this compulsory joinder
rule failed to provide for the contingency where it was wholly
impracticable or simply impossible to bring all interested persons
before the court individually. In response, the bill of peace device
was fashioned to allow equity courts to entertain representative
actions provided that the proposed representative could establish to
the court's satisfaction impossibility of joinder, common class in-
terests and his adequate representation of those common interests.30
The final judgment delivered in these early class suits was binding
on every group member, whether or not he actually participated
in the suit.8 1 Thus, a more flexible procedural device to encom-
pass group action was engendered by the practical necessity of
26. The footnotes will include references for the reader with more
specific or particularized interests in the federal class action.
27. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751
at 504 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. See also Z. CHAFEE,
SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 200-03 (1950).
28. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02 at 23-74 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Moore].
29. Id.
30. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1751 at 504.
31. Id. For citations to early English cases involving the use of this
device see Homburger, supra note 15, at 611 nn.12 & 13.
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providing a means of preventing mere numbers from disabling
groups of people, bound by common interest, from achieving equi-
table enforcement of their rights.
32
The English concept of a group remedy device was generally
acccepted in this country. Despite this, until the 1966 amendments
to Federal Rule 23,33 there remained considerable doubt as to the
binding nature of a class suit judgment on non-party members
of the class. Federal Equity Rule 48,31 in effect from 1848 through
1912, expressly provided that the final decree in a class action suit
was "without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent par-
ties.,
35
And yet, the Supreme Court in 1853 declared that a class suit
decree "binds all of them as if all were before the court."36 When
Federal Equity Rule 383T replaced Rule 48 in 1912, it made no
reference to this question.3 8 However, the Supreme Court shortly
thereafter ruled conclusively that a class action judgment bound
all class members including absentees.
3 9
In 1938, original Federal Rule 2340 replaced Equity Rule 38
and extended the scope of the class suit device. Like its predeces-
sor though, it made no mention of the effect of a final judgment on
those members of the class not actually parties to the action.
Moore, who composed the preliminary draft of the rule, had pro-
vided 41 for specific statements as the binding effect of a judg-
ment in each of the three separate class action categories, which he
called "true,' '42 "hybrid, '43 and "spurious; '44 but these statements
were deleted from the final draft.4 5
Nevertheless, original Rule 23 in final form did represent a
32. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir.
1948). See also Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the
Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 254 (1966).
33. See note 25 supra.
34. 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1842).
35. Id.
36. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
37. 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
38. .1d.
39. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
But see Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938).
40. -See note 24 supra.
41. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Some Problems Raised
by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 557, 571 (1937).
42. Original Rule 23 (a) (1).
43. Id. at (a) (2).
44. Id. at (a) (3).
45. For an explanation of the basis for the decision to omit see 3B
MooRE § 23.11 (1) at 23-2801.
"well-intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use of class
actions. '48 It went beyond Equity Rule 38 and covered legal as
well as equity actions. Consistent with its aim to broaden the use
of the device, the rule was expanded to include permissive joinder
situations involving only common questions of law or fact.4 7 In
addition, the Rule set forth, in terms of jural relationships, 48 the
specific types of suits which were to be amenable to class action
treatment. This schematization was to have simplified the mat-
ter procedurally for both the parties and the courts.
Courts' interpretations of this tri-partite schematization under
original Rule 23 gave rise to common usage of the terms true, hy-
brid and spurious, titles which Moore first suggested for his jural
relationships. 49 The true class action was to involve a number of
claims revolving around a single right in which there was a joint
or common interest. An example would be where a trust benefi-
ciary brings a class action as representative for all the trust bene-
ficiaries in order to restore diverted trust funds to the trust cor-
pus.50 Any single action by the defendant respecting the trust res
would affect each and every beneficiary regarding his or her com-
mon interest in the right to benefit from the trust. The hybrid
class action entailed the assertion of several rights, all of which,
in one way or another, were tied to a common fund or property.
For instance, a class suit initiated by a group of creditors who
sought to have their common debtor declared insolvent and to have
a common fund from his remaining resources established for their
benefit was determined to be hybrid for original Rule 23 pur-
poses.51 The court held that no joint interest in a single right ex-
isted since each creditor had to prove a separate and distinct set of
facts to make good his claim; and the hybrid label was deemed ap-
propriate since all the creditors' claims were predicated upon
the common fund to be established.52 Here, in contrast to the trust
beneficiary true class action, a single action by the defendant
would not necessarily affect each and every class member's inter-
est.
The spurious class action was little more than a permissive
joinder device under another name. It was undertaken to enforce
several rights where the only thread binding such rights was a
question of law or question of fact common to the assertion of
46. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1752 at 511.
47. Original Rule 23(a) (3).
48. Original Rule 23(a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3). Categorization
within one of these subsections was dependent upon the nature of the jural
relationship among the class members.
49. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
50. Bosenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir.
1942).




each against the defendant. No common right as in the true action
or common fund or property as in the hybrid action were required
to achieve recognition as a spurious class. For example, where a
number of retail merchants had severable claims for price discrim-
ination against a brewery, the court approved joining the claims
as a spurious class action on the basis of the common legal ques-
tion of price discrimination in violation of the antitrust laws.
53
At first glance the three categories may appear to be neatly
individuated and well-suited to easy distinction with respect to a
given fact situation. In practice, however, such was clearly not
the case. And not surprisingly so since close examination reveals
few, if any, readily discernible distinctions particularly between the
hybrid and the spurious categories. Rather than simplifying the
handling of class actions, as they were laudably intended to do, the
new categories served only to add new complications to an already
difficult task. Under the prior Federal Equity Rules 54 governing
class suits, there was little specific guidance as to the proper defini-
tion or use of the class suit device. Unfortunately, despite the
draftsmen's attempts to correct this failure through specification
and delineation in the categories of original Rule 23, more confu-
sion rather than less resulted through their use.
It became a near impossible task for a court to confidently
select one of the three categories in labelling a particular class.
The difficulty of this labelling effort, both practically and con-
ceptually, led Chaffee to remark that he had as much difficulty in
distinguishing a "common" right from a "several" one as he did "in
deciding whether some ties and dresses are green or blue. '55 Vis-
ual acuity alone would not have resolved these difficulties for the
Professor. For the moment, though, his point is well taken. It was
not uncommon for different courts faced with exactly parallel fact
situations to label them differently under original Rule 23. In fact,
even in single cases, the various judges ruling on the appropriate
Rule 23 classification were likely to disagree. A prime example
is Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation.5" In Deckert, a
series of separate decisions as to the correct categorization for the
class involved were in pronounced disagreement. Plaintiffs, as al-
leged hybrid class representatives, brought suit on behalf of alleg-
edly defrauded creditors of defendant as to a particular series of
53. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
54. Equity R. 48, 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1842); Equity R. 38, 226 U.S.
659 (1912).
55. CHAFEE, supra note 27, at 257.
56. 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
transactions. Defendant argued that the action would be properly
categorized as spurious. The initial district court consideration of
the case resulted in no opinion as to the correct label and the court
was satisfied to conclude merely that it was indeed a class action.57
At the appellate court level, the action was deemed to be spuri-
ous.58 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, nothing
was said as to the labelling question and the Court's only decision
was that the action was proper as a class suit.59 On remand, the
previously non-committal district court agreed this time with plain-
tiffs and chose hybrid.60 Finally, when the case reached the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals again, the court decided that names and
labels were not important. 61
This final determination by the court of appeals in Deckert
was the most prescient one. For, despite all the time and effort
spent by the Deckert and other courts in struggling with the three
categories, it actually did not make a great deal of difference which
label was used initially. As one commentator indicated, analysis of
the cases would "engender a suspicion that the generic appellations
derived from Rule 23(a) are used to describe results rather than
reach decisions."'6 2 Presumably implicit in the breakdown of orig-
inal Rule 23 (a) into three subsections was the fact that proceeding
under the guise of one or another of them would result in very
real differences in the attorney's handling and court's treatment of
a case with respect to such things as jurisdictional requirements,
the binding effect of judgments, and statute of limitations ques-
tions. Once again, however, initial expectations and presump-
tions as to the projected use of this Rule fell short of the eventual
realities.
63
This shortcoming is particularly disturbing as regards the is-
sue of the binding effect of judgments on absent class members
which touches upon the essence of the benefit of the class action
as a procedural device. Retrospectively, the Advisory Committee
seems to have been ill-advised in its decision 64 to omit Moore's
preliminary draft suggestions as to the binding nature of class ac-
tion judgments. It is not that his suggestions were undeniably cor-
rect; but, at least, they would have provided guidelines. Some
courts did follow the general drift of Moore's unadopted propos-
als to make the extent of the judgment dependent upon the cate-
57. 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
58. 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939).
59. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
60. 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
61. 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941).
62. Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23,
46 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 823 (1946).
63. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1752 at 512-13. See also Id. at §§ 1755-57
(jurisdictional requirements); 7A WRIe & MILLER § 1789 (effect of judg-
ments); Id. at § 1800 (statute of limitations).
64. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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gory of the action. This, of course, presumed facile and efficient
application of the three categories to various fact situations. 5 In
any event, more often than not, the extent of the judgment ren-
dered paralleled the jural relationships of the class members. 6
The greater the common bond among class members the more likely
it was that the judgment would have class-wide effect. In a true
action, all members were presumably bound.67 In a hybrid action,
members were bound only to the extent of their respective individ-
ual rights as to the common fund or property. 8 In a spurious ac-
tion, only parties were bound.° D
Other courts rejected this type of relationship between the
jural categories and the binding effect of judgment under them.0
The reasons given most often related to the generally prevailing
inability to use the categories consistently.7 1 The result was wide-
spread confusion on this point 72 and others. Consequently, coun-
sel attempting to plan the course of a class suit had no real guide-
lines for either strategy or client advice. Similarly, judges facing
the category selection task had little authoritative precedent to fol-
low and the precedents available were replete with contradictions.
This hodgepodge of inconsistency with respect to the proper use of
categories, the effect of judgments, etc. prompted a continuing out-
cry by judges73 as well as the writers74 for revision of original Rule
23. The 1966 Amendments were the results.75
Although original Rule 23 has been replaced, the federal ex-
65. As indicated previously, this presumption was not borne out in
practice. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
66. For an appreciation of how often more and how often not see
3B MooRE § 23.11(2).
67. 7A WRIGHT & MLLER § 1789 at 172.
68. Id. See also Towle v. Donnell, 159 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1951).
69. Id. at 73. But see Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.
1941). In some courts, "one-way intervention" was allowed whereby ab-
sent class members could wait until final judgment, determine whether
it was favorable to their interests, and then intervene or abstain.
70. Id. at 174.
71. Id. See, e.g., Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
72. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra. One appellate judge
commented: "The terminology shocks the aesthetic sense, and the succes-
sion of adjectives before the noun shows the poverty of imagination in
choice of terms characteristic of the legal profession." Pentland v. Dravco
Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945) (Goodrich, J.).
73. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 2.
74. See, e.g., Note, supra note 62.
75. An amendment was suggested in 1955 but not adopted. It related
to orders to be made in the court's discretion during the course of class
litigation under Rule 23. For the text of the rejected amendment and com-
mentary thereon see 3B Moose § 23.01 (5) -(7).
perience under it is of more than passing historical interest. A
number of states76 including Pennsylvania,7 7 retain procedural
rules identical or quite similar to original Rule 23. In a later sec-
tion 78 of this article, the Pennsylvania experience under the rule
will be covered in great detail. Criticisms of original Rule 23 lead-
ing to its revision and federal cases which attempted to interpret
it remain relevant to any consideration of Pennsylvania class action
law under Rule 2230. Before that, it is important to first examine
present Federal Rule 23, its advantages and disadvantages, the na-
ture of its uses and the restrictions on the availability of those
uses today.
B. The 1966 Amendments to Rule 23-What and Why
Federal Rule 23 was totally redrafted in the 1966 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to gain a full un-
derstanding of the evolution of the federal class action, it is impor-
tant to examine the then-compelling reasons for the drastic changes
in Rule 23 undertaken in 1966. A sequential approach such as
this is offered merely as a means to acquire a developmental appre-
ciation of the problems with original Rule 23, the hopeful revi-
sions of 1966 and the presently expanding difficulties with that
amended version of the Rule.
The substance, as well as the language, of original Rule 23
underwent significant alteration.7 9 In essence, three overriding
changes were effectuated. First, the true-hybrid-spurious tri-partite
division was abolished. Inherent therein was a conceptual shift
away from the jural relationships of the parties approach to one
which focuses instead on the appropriateness of resorting to the
class action device in any given factual situation. Consequently,
there is a greater emphasis on the continuing effect, through the
course of litigation, of proceeding under the class action imprimatur.
Second, there are specific provisions concerning the binding effect
of a class suit judgment. Third, the courts are invested with con-
siderable discretionary latitude in controlling procedural and ad-
ministrative matters during the course of a suit so as to promote
fairness to and adequate representation of absent class members.
Not everyone was imbued with the optimism of the drafts-
men80 with respect to the salutary effect of these sweeping changes.
76. For a list of the states, see note 251 infra.
77. For the text of the Pennsylvania Rule, see note 20 supra.
78. See Section III infra.
79. For text of amended Rule 23, see note 25 supra. For the most
part further references to amended Rule 23 will not be footnoted specif-
ically. Reference should be made to note 25 supra.
80. See generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
54 GEo. L.J. 1204 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 17.
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Some still favored the original Rule 23 approach.8 1 Others were
alarmed by the wide discretion devolving upon district court judges
under the amended Rule. Justice Black was particularly uneasy
on this point.
It seems to me that they place too much power inthe
hands of the trial judges and that the rules might almost
as well simply provide that 'class suits can be maintained
either for or against particular groups whenever in the dis-
cretion of a judge he thinks it wise.'
8 2
For the most part though, and no doubt due to the acknowledged
difficulties of practice under original Rule 23, guarded optimism
was the rule.
The Advisory Committee's Note83 to the 1966 amendments is
the key to understanding the impetus for, and intended scope of,
the changes. The treatment of difficulties with original Rule 23
clearly reflects the heretofore discussed widespread dissatisfaction
with the original Rule. The Committee noted that, originally, it
was felt
that the definitions accurately described the situations
amenable to the class-suit device, and also would indicate
the proper extent of the judgment in each category, which
would in turn help to determine the res judicata effect
of the judgment .... 84
Unfortunately, the three categories proved unworkable, "obscure
and uncertain."8 5 Furthermore, they did not relate in any consist-
ent way to the determination as to the extent of a judgment.8 6
Moreover, the spurious class action proved to be an anomaly.
8 7
Although parading as a class suit, it failed to resolve the interest
of those non-intervening "class members" not actually party to
the suit. In addition, original Rule 23 failed to take cognizance of
the need for guaranteeing procedural fairness to absentee class
members.88 No procedures or guidelines for notice were set forth
either as to those absentees already ascertained but who were not
81. See, e.g., Van DerCreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of Class Actions
Under Federal Rule 23, 48 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1963).
82. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Court, 383 U.S. 1029, 1035 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
83. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966). The purpose here is to pro-
vide a basis for comparison between original Rule 23 and amended Rule





87. Id. at 99.
88. Id.
yet parties, or as to potential class members as yet unaware of the
initiation of an action affecting their "class" interests. This, in
turn, left untouched the vital issue of the effect of a judgment
upon either of these two groups of unnotified, but interested indi-
viduals.
The advisory Committee expressed confidence that these diffi-
culties had been recognized and resolved in the amended Rule. 9
The Rule itself90 mirrors the anticipated course of conduct of a
class suit in logical progression from initial class formation to final
judgment or dismissal.
Section (a) announces prerequisites for initial recognition as a
class. Although indispensable to the maintenance of a class action,
satisfaction of these is not, in and of itself, sufficient for achieve-
ment of class status. Section (b) points out the additional factors
which "in varying situations will justify the use of the class action
device." 9' The four preliminary requirements of (a), all of which
must be present, are: (1) impracticability of joinder due to size of
the class; (2) common class questions of law or fact; (3) claims of
absent class members typified by claims of the class representative;
and (4) the representative must fairly and adequately protect the
interests of those class members not party to the suit. The tenor of
these basic requirements evinces the draftsman's obvious inten-
tion to provide a procedural vehicle for efficient handling of a mul-
titude of nearly identical legal conflicts by resort to a single repre-
sentative suit. Equally as clear is the desire to insure that the
rights and liabilities of those individuals who are not actual par-
ties receive the same protection they would if all class members
were before the court. These dual concerns underlie all the provi-
sions of amended Rule 23.
Section (b) authorizes class action status if the requirements of
(a) are met and, in addition, the suit falls within one of (b)'s
three categories. These categories are not reworded versions of
true-hybrid-spurious scheme of old. They are based instead on the
appropriateness of the device's use in distinct situations.
The common theme of (b) (1) (A) and (b) (1) (B) is avoid-
ance of the risk of inconsistent adjudications if separate suits,
rather than a single class suit, were brought.92 Section (b) (1) (A)
focuses on prevention of the imposition of varying standards of
89. Id.
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occa-
sions for maintaining class actions; provides that all class actions
maintained to the end as such will result in judgments including
those whom the court finds to be members of the class; and refers
to the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct
of these actions.
Id.
90. Compare note 25 supra with note 24 supra.




conduct on the party opposing the class with respect to multiple
class members proceeding on or defending against the same or
similar legal claims. The aim, then, is unitary adjudication of
the duties of the opposing party.9 As such, a proscribed course
of conduct rather than money damages is the remedy usually
sought. An appropriate situation for (b) (1) (A) treatment would
involve, for example, individual suits by various landowners with
respect to a purported nuisance 4 or a number of suits by a number
of local citizens each seeking the invalidation of a local govern-
ment bond issue.95
Subsection (b) (1) (B) contemplates the negative effects of sep-
arate adjudications on the potential class itself. It envisages a situ-
ation where judgment in a non-class action by or against a class
member, "while not technically concluding the other members,
might do so as a practical matter ... [and] the other members...
would have no representation in the law suit.' '9 6 A plain example
is where claims against a fund, inadequate to satisfy all rightful
claims, are made by only a few of the total number entitled to so
claim.9 7 There the claims of a few work to impede unilaterally
the ability of the rest to protect their own interests; a (b) (1) (B)
class action would be appropriate to settle all the claims fairly in
one proceeding.
Section (b) (2) is particularly suited to civil rights cases,
though it is amendable to other uses. It envisions situations "where
a party has taken or refused to take action with respect to a
class"9 and final injunctive or declaratory relief is required to de-
termine "the legality of behavior with respect to the class as a
whole." 99 Significantly, each alleged class member need only be
potentially subject to the action or lack of action by the defendant
solely by reason of his or her membership in a definable class. It
is sufficient that the defendant's activities have affected or threat-
ened only one class member provided the above potentiality as to
rest is established.100
For a section (b) (3) class suit, two added requirements must
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Cf. Stanley v. Dept. of Conservation and Development, 284 N.C.
15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
96. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100-01 (1966).
97. Id. at 101 citing Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
98. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
99. Id.
100. Id.
be satisfied: the court must be convinced that common questions
of law or fact predominate over those affecting the members as
individuals and that the class device is superior to alternative
means for handling the questions involved.10 1 This was intended
as a catch-all category. 102 Its inclusion recognizes that in certain
circumstances where class status is unattainable under (b) (1) or
(b) (2) "it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.' 01 3 In
those instances, a class action would be approved in order to
"achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uni-
formity of decision as to persons similarly situated without sacri-
ficing procedural fairness .... ,,104 Alleged (b) (3) suits were
viewed as inevitably raising close inclusion/exclusion questions.
Fraud by misrepresentation is illustrative. A single defendant's
fraud visited upon various individuals by the use of similar mis-
representations, even though the individual losses may differ, is a
good candidate for (b) (3) coverage. 10 And yet, fraud against
another group of individuals by the same mendacious defendant,
but with material variations in his representations or in LIIe kind
or degree of their reliance on his misstatements, is not likely to be
afforded (b) (3) treatment. 0 6
Thus, (a) and (b) relate the parameters for determining the ap-
propriateness of class status in any situation. Sections (c), (d) and
(e) describe the various court functions and procedural options in
handling the class action once in progress. Section (c) (1) serves
as the transition between these two aspects of the Rule. There-
under, it is incumbent upon the court to decide "as early in the
proceedings as may be practicable"' 0 7 whether an action is to be
sustained as a class action. This, of course, is accomplished by ref-
erence to the relevant provisions of sections (a) and (b).108 This
determination may be conditional. The court has to option to hold
its appropriateness determination pending further action by the
representative or further factual developments. This flexibility
101. Section (b) (3) of Amended Rule 23 provides a non-exhaustive
list of considerations for the court which are pertinent:
(A) the interest of the members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
Amended Rule 23 (b) (3).
102. And yet, it is this section which has given rise to the most contro-
versy as to the appropriateness of class action use. See notes 143-44 ana
accompanying text infra.
103. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
104. Id. at 103.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 104.
108. For the effect of a negative determination see Adv. Com. Note,
39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966).
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is indicative of the rulemakers' continuing attempt to encourage
and facilitate the use of the device. In addition, under (c) (1) the
court in its discretion may order or forego notification of class
members that a (c) (1) determination actually has been made or is
about to be made.10 9 The rule fails to delineate, however, the
manner in which the question itself is to be raised. Because it is
the court's affirmative duty to make the determination, it seems
unlikely that a court would be barred from initiating consideration
on its own motion at the appropriate time should the parties have
failed to so move.
Section (c) (2) relates only to (b) (3) actions. It is a mandatory
notice provision requiring that class members identifiable through
reasonable effort110 must be individually advised, in the best prac-
ticable way under the circumstances, of the alternatives open to
them as a result of their presumptive class membership. With par-
ticularity, this means they must be notified of their option to ex-
clude themselves from the class; "I of the binding effect of the fi-
nal judgment on them should they fail to opt out by the specified
date; 1 2 and of the further option of those included in the class to
enter an appearance through counsel."'3 This is a crucial step in
the evolution of the class action concept since it eradicates the prior
anomaly of spurious class action judgments which were binding
only on actual parties. Of similar import is the express elimina-
tion of the possibility of one-way intervention after a decision on
the merits.114 The difference in degree of concern, as demon-
strated here and in original Rule 23, for protection of the absent
class member is clear. The emphasis on this protection is contin-
ued in section (c) (3).
That section sets forth the effect of judgment rules for
amended Rule 23 class actions. Such provisions were conspicu-
ously absent from original Rule 23." 5 Now the court is to deter-
mine who the members of the class are and a judgment, whether
under (b) (1) or (b) (2) or (b) (3), "shall include and describe""' 6
them. For (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions, this does not require indi-
109. See also Amended Rule 23 (d) (2).
110. Presumably, those not identifiable through reasonable effort
would receive whatever notice, short of individual notice, is practicable
under the circumstances.
111. Amended Rule 23(c) (2) (A).
112. Amended Rule 23(c) (2) (B).
113. Amended Rule 23(c) (2) (C).
114. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
115. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
116. Amended Rule 23(c) (3).
vidual specification of all class members. 117 For (b) (3) actions,
all those to whom (c) (2) notice was directed, except opt outs and
others whom the court had found not to be class members, are
presumptively bound.11 The court's judgment is to specify identi-
fied class members and just describe the remaining ones.119 These
rules apply equally to favorable and unfavorable judgments.
One further point as to (c) (3) deserves mention. Strictly
speaking, this inclusion/exclusion description of class members by
the court does not cast the court in a deus ex machina role as re-
gards res judicata. It is a long standing rule that ultimate res judi-
cata effects can only be determined in a subsequent collateral at-
tack on the judgment. The rule is no different here.120 How-
ever, the court's inclusion/exclusion description of the class in its
judgment is sure to have far-reaching effects on any subsequent
attack. Assuredly, "if the matter is carefully considered, ques-
tions of res judicata are less likely to be raised . . . and if raised
will be more satisfactorily answered.'
2 1
Section (c) (4) permits the division of a class into sub-classes or
the limitation of a class action to particular issues. Again, this
procedural flexibility, after the initial propriety of class status
has been favorably decided, manifests the emphasis on continuance
of the class suit in whatever fair way possible as opposed to dis-
missal every time a difficulty arises.
Section (d) (1-5) contains a list of suggested procedural orders
which the courts may find helpful in controlling a class action
fairly and efficiently. The list is not intended to be complete.
The eunmerated suggestions all seem to flow logically from the
general discretionary power of the court over a class suit. Sec-
tion (d) (2), though, is also important for another reason. It pro-
vides for a discretionary notice-giving power in the court which
when necessary can be used to complement the mandatory notice
of (c) (2). One possibility for its use would be to permit absent (b)
(3) class members to protest the adequacy of representation they
are receiving. 122 Or it would be used to solicit the views of absen-
tees on any matter which was vital to their interests. The re-
peated emphasis on notice here and under (c) (2) "is designed to
fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action proce-
dure is of course subject."'
123
Section (e) precludes dismissal or compromise of a class action
without court approval subsequent to notice to all members.
117. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 106. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 311 U.S. 32
(1940); Hansberry v. Lee, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
121. Adv. Com. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 107,
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This is yet another measure which protects the interests of the ab-
sentees by preventing individual class representatives from per-
sonally profiting by a settlement with anxious defendants at the
expense of the absent and unspoken for class members. Very sim-
ply put, this section and other measures designed to protect absent
class members attempt to insure the true representative nature of
the class suit.
This, then, was the federal procedural rulemaking body's re-
sponse to the recognized difficulties with original Rule 23. As in-
dicated, the Advisory Committee attempted to make clear what
was intended and how they thought the desired changes could
best be accomplished. The record of class action litigation over
the last eight years measures their success in attaining their goals
and new problems created by the methods they chose.
C. Amended Rule 23-Old Problems Solved, New Difficulties
Created: 1966-1974.
In 1966, there was hope that the amendments to Rule 23 would
provide an efficient and functional procedural device suited to
handling complex, multiple party litigation in the federal courts.
Eight years have passed and one would think that reliable indica-
tions of the success or failure of amended Rule 23 would abound.
Although there is no dearth of opinions offered,124 there is unfor-
tunately no consensus, no conclusive indicator one way or the other
as to such success or failure. There are those who extol the class
action as a device made in heaven and an equal number who
denigrate it as evil incarnate. This disparity derives from a basic
disagreement as to the main purpose for the existence of such a
device. On one hand, it is said that the primary reason for the
class action is to fulfill the "historic mission of taking care of
the smaller guy." 125 Its availability acts as insurance that groups
of people who would otherwise be incapable of taking a common
adversary to court have a means of vindicating their rights.126
On the other hand, it is contended that the central aim is to
124. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
125. Remarks of Bernard Kaplan, Reporter to the Advisory Committee,
to Judge Frankel as reported in Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's
Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966).
126. Class actions "operate as a legal aid and device for the benefit
of similarly situated claimants who could succeed only by marshalling
their combined strength." Homburger, supra note 15, at 641. Cf. Ford,
supra note 2; Kaplan, supra note 2; Pomerantz, supra note 1; Weinstein,
Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299
(1973).
"achieve economies of time, effort and expense"'127 in group liti-
gation. If anything, the criticis say, quite the opposite effect has
been the rule under amended Rule 23.128 Proponents claim great
success for the class action and suggest that only a little more time
is needed to remedy current shortcomings. 12 9  Opponents decry
the alleged conversion of the federal judiciary into a small claims
court 130 and augur the complete breakdown of the federal courts
if class action use continues unchecked.' 3 ' The neutral observer
can only offer that some old problems have been solved and a
panoply of new ones have been created.
A favorable attitude toward the class action by the federal ju-
diciary has been instrumental in the proliferation of its use. Mar-
ginal actions, it appears, are to receive the benefit of the doubt.
Rule 23 is to be given a liberal rather than restrictive interpreta-
tion.1 2 In doubtful cases, "if there is an error to be made, let it
be made in favor and not against the maintenance of class ac-
tion." 3 3 Through their broad discretionary power, the courts have
proved very sympathetic and quick to extend "a helping hand to
overcome the rule's congenital handicaps." 134 It has been sug-
gested, however, that the courts in their rush to maintain the
liberal spirit of Rule 23 have demonstrated a marked disregard
for the rights of defendants. 13 5 Other complaints center around
the extreme uses of the device alleged prompted by the courts'
encouraging attitudes. For instance, class status has been alleged
on behalf of: 125,000,000 urban residents seeking $375,000,000,000
127. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 515, 517 (1969), quoting from Adv. Com. Note.
128. See, e.g., Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Prac-
tice Under Amended Rule 23, 28 Bus. L. 741 (1973).
129. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 126.
130. Handler, supra note 5, at 11.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., In re Caesar's Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp.
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
133. Esrlin v. Hirsche, 402 F.2d 92, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 928 (1969). Accord, Kahan v. Rosentiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
134. Homburger, supra note 15, at 642. Cf. Doglow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.
1971); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
135. One writer points to the following remarks to support such a
charge.
Occasionally, of course, this can only be achieved at the ex-
pense of some traditional safeguards, most notably jury trial.
Nonetheless, simplifying the process of establishing individual
claims may be the only way of making it economically feasible
for class members to come forward and assert their rights. As
a result, some of the procedural patterns that are considered fun-.
damental when the litigation will have to be abandoned or modi-
fied in certain actions under Rule 23 (b) (3).
Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions under
Federal Rule 23(b) (3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 507 (1972).
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in damages from auto manufacturers for air pollution; 136 all con-
sumers of eggs in the United States; 3 7 all the homeowners in the
United States;"8 the half million lifetime members of the Califor-
nia Playboy Club; 139 and everybody in the United States. 40 Po-
tential excesses, 4' not unlike these cases, have caused some
dampening of the initial enthusiasm for the Rule and the inherent
limitations on its use are only now receiving due consideration.142
By far the majority of class actions since 1966 have been (b) (3)
actions. 143 Concomitantly, most of the controversy has arisen in
the course of (b) (3) proceedings. In fact, if there is now a choice
between proceeding under (b) (3) or non- (b) (3) status, most often
the latter alternative will be selected. 44 Beyond these general
problems, amended Rule 23 has introduced a plethora of specific
problem areas to class action law, most occurring in the context of
(b) (3) actions. A discussion of two of the most prominent fol-
lows. 4 5
136. See Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,
463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
137. United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l. Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
138. Mongano v. American Standard, Inc., Civil No. 69-861 (E.D. Pa.
1969), consolidated in, In re Plumbing Fixtures, 311 F. Supp. 349, (Jud.
P. Mul. Dist. Lit. 1970).
139. Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l., Inc., Civil No. 832939 (L.A.
Super. Ct. 1968).
140. Handy v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 69-1548-R (C.D. Cal.
1969).
141. These suits are not ipso facto abusive uses of the class action de-
vice. In theory at least, it is entirely conceivable that a proper and appro-
priate class action could be brought on behalf of all the members in one
or another of these groups, presuming of course the existence of the requi-
site commonalities.
142. See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1973). Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968), with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, - U.S. - (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
See also Burger, The State of the Judiciary-970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
143. C. WRICHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS 312 (2d ed. 1970).
144. This is done primarily in order to avoid the onerous burden of
(c) (2) notice. See, e.g., Harper v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973). Cf. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refinery Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.
Ga. 1972); Boles v. Union Camp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 46 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Sam-
uel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also
Biechle v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
145. Extended arguments, pro and con, as to the proper resolution of
these problems and others under Amended Rule 23 are beyond the scope
of this article. Ample treatment can be found by reference to the sources
cited throughout the article. In addition, a brief list of citations to comple-
ment those appearing herein is provided below. The purpose here is to
1. "Appropriateness?"
Amended Rule 23(a) sets forth the general prerequisites for
achieving class status. 148 These initial checkpoints have created
a number of, as yet, unresolved questions. Answers to these ques-
tions are crucial to the attorney in the process of trying to decide
whether or not his action is suitable for class treatment.
Class size and impracticability of joinder are intertwined in
the first of these prerequisites. How many are too many claims to
handle in the case? How many are too few to deserve class recog-
nition?147 Resolution of the proper number is an ad hoc determi-
high-light the two major problem areas under Amended Rule 23 in an
effort to demonstrate that the 1966 amendments have created many com-
plex, new difficulties in addition to having solved or abolished certain of
the old ones. This point takes on added significance in the context of
any forthcoming re-evaluation in Pennsylvania of Rule 2230. We submit
that if the decision to revise P.R.C.P. 2230 is made, wholesale adoption
nf the 1966 federal revision would soon prove an ill-begotten next step.
For a discussion of the general subject area see B. Moore, The Poten-
tial Function of the Modern Class Action Suit, 2 CLASS AcTI N 47 (1973).
On the appropriateness question see Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class
Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 527 (1969); Hart
& Forde, Practical Problems in Handling Class Actions, 15 TaRIA LAWYER'S
GumE 549 (1971).
As to notice, see Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements
of Notice Under 23(c)(2), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 571 (1969); Note,
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29
MD. L. REv. 139 (1969); Note, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calcula-
tion in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1971); Note, Adequate
Representation, Notice, and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating the
Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889 (1969).
For treatment of various aspects of the resolution of a class suit, see
Blecker, Antitrust Class Actions: Discovery and Trial, 41 ANTITRUST L.J.
240 (1972); Kelly, Attorney's Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust
Litigation, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1656 (1972); McGough & Lerach, Terminations
of Class Actions: The Judicial Role, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 445 (1972); Note,
Appealability of a Class Action Dismissal: The Death Knell Doctrine, 39
U. Cm-i. L. REv. 403 (1972); Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions:
The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448 (1972); Note, Judicially Di-
rected Conversions to Class Action after Judgment, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 853
(1972).
For the considerations inherent in particular types of class action lit-
igation, see Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the
Federal Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. PITT. L. REv.
39 (1971); Subrin & Sutton, Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court: A
Procedural Analysis, 8 HARv. Crv. RTS. & LiB. L. REV. 21 (1973); Sympo-
sium, Amended Federal Rule 23: Antitrust Class Actions, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 251 (1966); Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental
Litigation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1972); Note, Adequate Representation, No-
tice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating the Remedies Provided
by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889 (1969); Note, Taxpayers'
Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder,
79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970).
146. For a discussion of these as to their intendment when drafted,
see Section II, B supra.
147. These questions are two of a number of threshold determinations
which Judge Fullam of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested
are incumbent on a federal judge as he first approaches an alleged class
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nation dependent entirely on the circumstances of the case at hand.
This remains true for the purposes of both maximum and mini-
mum numbers of class members. Failure to state the number
exactly is not a bar to class status.
148
Generally speaking, a group of fifteen to twenty in a damages
action is likely to be too small unless special circumstances pre-
vail which make joinder impracticable. 149 For Rule 23, imprac-
ticable means not impossibility but rather great difficulty or in-
convenience.15 0 And the burden is on the class representative to
prove the class so numerous as to prevent practicable joinder.
15t
In one case, however, the purported class representative was al-
lowed to proceed despite the fact that he failed to prove the exist-
ence of any other class member. 152 In that case, the court virtu-
ally took judicial notice of their existence. 1 3
At the other end of the scale, the seeming danger of too many
class members is that the action will prove so unwieldy as to be
incapable of fair management. Despite this, classes consisting of
millions of members have been approved. 5 4 Surely, this fear of
unmanageability has no initial basis15 5 in many cases since the
court has expansive discretion to sub-divide into sub-classes or
narrower insulated issues,156 to make almost any procedural
order1 57 and to make class recognition conditional on further
developments.1 58  Of course, the impracticability of joinder ele-
ment is particularly apposite to the possibly too-large class. 5 9
suit. See Fullam, Federal Rule 23: An Exercise in Utility, 38 J. AiR LAw
& COM. 369 (1972).
148. Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
149. See, e.g., Glover v. McMurray, 361 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150. See, e.g., Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn.
1973).
151. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Wometco Blue Circle, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 308
(E.D. Tenn. 1972).
152. Getling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971).
153. Id. at 392.
154. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
155. See Fullam, supra note 147, at 372; Comment, Management Prob-
lems of the Class Action Under Rule 23(b)(3), 6 UNV. S. FRAN. L. REv.
343, 348 (1972). But see Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45,
71 (D.N.J. 1971).
156. Amended Rule 23(c) (4).
157. Amended Rule 23(d) (5).
158. Amended Rule 23(c) (1).
159. One court has offered this threefold formula for deciding the im-
practicability question: (1) geographic distribution of members, (2) bur-
den on court by mass intervention, and (3) inconvenience to small claim-
ant class member. See Vernon J. Rockler Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc.,
52 F.R.D. 335 (D. Minn. 1971).
The common question requirement'"0 also requires ad hoc de-
termination with little reference to any established general rule.
This determination turns on whether there is a sufficient iden-
tity' 6 ' of claims among alleged members. It is not necessary for
all questions of law and fact to be common to all class mem-
bers.16 2 Similarly, the fact that questions peculiar to various in-
dividual class members remain after resolution of the questions
common to the class does not compel dissolution of the class. 63
Basically, all this means is that no major conflicts of interests
should exist among members. Absolute identity is not required.
Individualized questions can co-exist with common questions with-
in the class structure; but the requirement of commonality focuses
on the determination whether those individual questions are so
predominant that they destroy the unity and utility of the class
action.164 Whether the common question prerequisite requires
identity of remedies sought is an unresolved question. Certainly,
a general common interest in the relief sought is mandatory. 165
The need for separate adjudication of the appropriate individu
damages recoverable probably, however, poses no threat to the
maintenance of class status.166 Inferentially, though, any signi-
ficant disparity in the forms or amounts of relief sought by in-
dividual members would seem to reflect adversely on the alleged
(and required) oneness as to questions of law or fact. In sum,
the basic premise throughout is "a common nucleus of operative
facts even though there may be lacking complete identity."' 6
7
A further subsection of 23 (a) requires an investigation of the
proposed role and asserted qualifications of the representative ap-
pearing before the court on behalf of so many others. Not only
160. Amended Rule 23(a) (2).
161. See, e.g., In re Caesar's Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp.
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, 59 F.R.D. 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa
1972).
162. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
163. See, e.g., Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84
(D.D.C. 1972).
164. See, e.g., Partian v. First Nat'l. Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala.
1973).
165. See, e.g., Arneson v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 59 F.R.D.
145 (D.C. Cal. 1973). In this regard, it should be noted that actions with
a defendant class are not common; one area where they do occur with
some frequency is patent infringement. See, e.g., Dale Electronics, Inc. v.
R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971).
166. See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l. Bank, 59 F.R.D. 584 (D.D.C.
1972).
167. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal.
1967). Accord, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.1968);Philadel-
phia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kronenberg v. Hotel Gov-
ernor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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must that representative demonstrate his ability to fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the represented but he must in ad-
dition show that his claims are typical of those of the absentees.
This concern with the adequacy of representation along with the
emphasis on notice reflects the ubiquitous role which due proc-
ess fairness to absent members plays in achieving compliance with
Rule 23. In this regard, Professor Kaplan has remarked that "fair
play to the class comes about through adequacy of representation
more than through notice.' 168 In part due to this pervasive influ-
ence of due process, the adequacy requirements are to be strictly
construed and stringently applied. 169
The primary considerations involved in determining represen-
tative adequacy are three in number. Each is closely related to,
and yet distinct from, the others. And each raises its own difficul-
ties in the attempt to take its measure. First, it is mandatory
that the representative actually be a member of the affected class' 70
he purports to represent.' 7 ' The correlation to adequacy of repre-
sentation is obvious. Second, the representative's claim must be
typical of those of his fellow class members. As with the com-
monness requirement, this typicality does not mean identity. Its
function is merely to guard against collusive suits and purported
representatives whose own interests are actually directly antag-
onistic to those of the remaining class members.172 And this con-
flict of interest question obtains not only as to immediate differ-
ences between representative and class but also to potential dif-
ferences likely to occur from the litigation.173 As with the com-
monness determination, however, the fatal disparity would be
as to the liability rather than the damages portion of the case.
7 4
The third requirement of the representative is that he be
able to "put up a real fight.' 75 The primary criteria to be met is
that his attorney is qualified, experienced and generally able to
168. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 499.
169. Hettinger v. Glass Specialty Co., 59 F.R.D. 286, 298 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
170. See Blankenship v. Wometco Blue Circle, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 308 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972).
171. See, e.g., Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.
Pa. 1973); Elias v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D.
Minn. 1973).
172. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
173. See, e.g., Du Pont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
174. See, e.g., In re Four Seasons Secs. Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 667
(D. Okla. 1973).
175. Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Accord,
Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l. Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84, 89 (DD.C. 1972);
In re Caesar's Palace Secs. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
conduct the proposed litigation.176 In this connection, neither the
proportionately small size of the representative's own claim or a
lack of interest in his efforts on the part of absent class members
spells inadequacy.
17
If a self-professed representative fails to meet any or all of
these adequacy strictures, it seems illogical to dismiss the class
action in limine. Of course, this subsumes the legitimacy of the
substantive basis for the group claim. The only failing is the lack
of capacity of the individual who seeks to represent the group and,
in such a case, the court certainly possesses sufficient discretion to
keep the otherwise legitimate class suit alive. Under 23(d) (2)
specific "adequacy standards" for whomever is to be representa-
tive could be imposed. 78 Under 23(c) (1), continued class recogni-
tion could be conditioned upon the production of a proper repre-
sentative within a specified time period. Substitute representa-
tives have been approved in special circumstances. 179 Such activity
by the court would be in keeping with the liberal spirit in which
ULe "~Ulu ja LU Uic 11III tt: 'U- anU Serve Vb prutectiongiiL
betrayal of the interests of unrepresented class members.
2. Notice
Notice, the other due process element, has given rise to many
of the knottiest of the new difficulties in class action practice un-
der amended Rule 23. The Rule provides for three varieties:
mandatory notice for (b) (3) actions under (c) (2); discretionary no-
tice as ordered by the court when necessary under (d) (2); and no-
tice of settlement or compromise under (e). Though important in
the scheme of flexible use designed for the class action device, the
latter two types of notice have stirred little controversy. Notice of
the (c)(2) variety, however, has proved a major stumbling block
in the course of much recent class action litigation.'8 ' The central
conflict involves an inability, to date, to devise a method whereby
absent class members receive adequate notice of their options
without simultaneously foreclosing the representative (and conse-
quently the class itself) from proceeding due to the prohibitive
cost of said notice. From this general conflict there arises, in
turn, numerous narrower issues which are also unresolved as yet.
176. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
Accord, Williams v. Local 19, Sheet Metal Workers, 59 F.R.D. 49, 55 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
177. See, e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa
1972).
178. See Amended Rule 23(d) (2).
179. See, e.g., Wymeleberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
180. See notes 132-134 and accompanying text supra.
181. A prime example is Eisen, now in its eighth year of preliminary
proceedings on the questions of notice required and notice costs, among
others. For full citation history of Eisen, see note 12 supra. See also
Greenfield v. Village Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Supporters of expanded use of the class action warn that
overemphasis on notice may, in the long run, act to defeat the
purpose for which Rule 23 was amended, to encourage class ac-
tions.18 2 In fact, various defense attorneys already have seized
upon notice requirement and insisted on the strictest compliance
by class action plaintiffs. 183 This insistence that no one be over-
looked often can mean that no one will ever be reached since the
resulting financial impossibility of strict compliance may act to
defeat a valid class action at its inception.
And yet, the prospect of full notice to all probable class mem-
bers if fully implemented invokes fear in defense attorneys faced
with what they believe to be a frivolous suit. Illegitimate class
representatives, perhaps even with the court's unintended bless-
ings, can solicit, even conscript, class members under the guise of
notice. 84 The pressure to settle in large class suits is painful
enough for a defendant faced with a proper class suit predicated on
sound claims.8 5 That this pressure is real is recognized, in part,
by the provision in amended Rule 23(e) requiring prior court ap-
proval of any settlement or compromise. And the pressure from
a cost-benefit point of view is no less persistent and doubly pain-
ful when the presumed class representative presents a highly dubi-.
ous claim. 8 6 Even the admittedly innocent defendant, when faced
with the unpredictability of a jury, may have no practical alterna-
tive but settlement. One writer proffers the thought that
any device which is workable only because it utilizes the
threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel
settlement is not a rule of procedure-it is a form of legal-
ized blackmail. 87
These fears aside, the very basic question whether notice is re-
quired by the Rule or the Constitution in all instances is far from
settled. This basic question is actually two questions: first, what
level of notice is the minimum required by due process?; and sec-
ond, is notice impliedly required by the Rule in non-(b)(3) as
well as (b) (3) cases? To merely say that disagreement exists is to
182. See, e.g., Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd on grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971). For an example of the
realization of this fear, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973, cert. granted, U.S. (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S.
Oct. 16, 1973)).
183. For an extended discussion of this defense tactic by a plaintiff's
attorney, see Pomerantz, supra note 1.
184. See Pollack, supra note 128, at 742-43.
185. See Fullam, supra note 147; Handler, supra note 5, at 8-9.
186. See Simon, supra note 4, at 388-91.
187. Handler, supra note 5, at 9.
do disservice to the magnitude of dissension surrounding these
questions. At one extreme, claims are made that full individual
notice is an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the mainte-
nance of any class action.1 8 At the other, the view is espoused
that the matter rests entirely within the discretion of the court
regardless of the type of class involved and that due process is
only one of a number of factors to be considered in fashioning the
best notice practicable under the circumstances. 18 9 Endless vari-
ations on these extremes have been suggested. 190 This imbroglio
in an area where inconclusiveness was to have been a thing of
the past (i.e., pre-1966)191 is unsettling.
Less theoretical, but no less disturbing, notice problems also
exist with respect to the assessment of the costs of notice. Neither
amended Rule 23 nor the Advisory Committee Note offer any clue
as to who is to bear the costs of notice. For the most part, it has
long been presumed that the party who brings the action would, of
course, pay all the necessary costs of meeting the requirements for
maintenance of the action. Thule district court In Eisen stated that
the question is "an appropriate area for the exercise of the court's
discretion" when plaintiff is unable to pay.19 2 Traditionalists may
well disagree, but such sentiment is clearly in line with the liber-
al interpretations called for to enable class actions to proceed.193
In School District of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row, 94 the court
assumed the costs of notice distribution. Defendants, in other
cases, have been charged with initial costs. 95 In Doglow, Judge
Weinstein explained that since it was the defendant who really
benefited from notice, he should pay for it. 19 6  Once plaintiffs
have established a prima facie case, full notice gives defendant
the res judicata benefit of having all claims in the matter settled
once and for all.1 97 At the "mini-hearing" in Eisen, it was de-
188. See Maraist and Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage:
Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1970).
189. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
313 (1973).
190. See, e.g., Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule
23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rxv. 557 (1969). For a novel approach,
see Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1967), aff'd, Robinson
v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 847 (1969) where a district judge remarked that the
best notice was the news coverage of his decision in this welfare residency
requirement case.
191. See notes 111-123 and accompanying text supra. See also note
228 supra.
192. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
193. See notes 132-134 and accompanying text supra.
194. 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
195. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D.
Pa. 1972); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Civ. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (1973) (42
U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)). Cf. Ward & Elliot, supra note 190,
at 564.




termined that plaintiff, who could ill-afford notice to his six mil-
lion class brethren, enjoyed a ninety per cent probability of suc-
cess on the merits and therefore defendants ought to pay ninety
per cent of the notice costs. 19 On appeal, this novel approach was
overturned. 19 9 In short, this aspect of notice, like many others,
continues unresolved. The vagaries of Rule 23 notice do not
end there. Many questions remain as to timing, content, meth-
ods, opt-out vs. opt-in and other notice peculiarities.
These difficulties with notice and with 23 (a) "appropriateness"
are only two of the more prominent among a growing array of
problem areas under amended Rule 23. The American College of
Trial Lawyers (ACTL) has issued a report calling for another thor-
oughgoing revision of Rule 23.200 The Trial Lawyers complain that
the purposes of the 1966 revisions have been subverted, and the de-
vice has become a means for enriching attorneys, blackmailing and
economically punishing innocent defendants, and promoting the
proliferation of frivolous claims. All that in just eight years. Anti-
thetically, those still faithful to amended Rule 23 ask for for pa-
tience with this nascent device.
With the passage of time and the accumulation of ex-
perience under the rule, . . . I believe Rule 23 will prove
to be a very valuable keystone in making federal proce-
dure responsible to the exigencies of the Twentieth Cen-
tury and particularly the needs of contemporary litiga-
tion.
20o
Recent case law, however, casts a shadow on such gradiose expecta-
tions for the federal class action device.
D. Recent Restrictions on Class Action Access to the
Federal Forum.
New obstacles in class action access ability to federal courts
198. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, U.S. (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
199. Id.
200. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1972). But see, Patrick & Cherner, Rule 23 and the Class Ac-
tion for Damages: A Reply to the Report of the American College of Trial
Lawyers, 28 Bus. L. 1097 (1973). Cf. Brief for American College of Trial
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae (in favor of affirmance of Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); cert. granted, U.S.
(1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)). But cf. Brief for Attorney
General of New York as Amicus Curiae (in favor of reversal of Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S.
(1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
201. Miller, supra note 189, at 334.
portend that future use of the class device, particularly in (b) (3)
cases, will be subject to severe limitations. Three recent class ac-
tion decisions-Snyder v. Harris,20 2 Zahn v. International Paper
Company203 and Eisen 111204 are in marked contrast to hereto-
fore liberal spirit with which the federal judiciary has treated
amended Rule 23 class suits. In turn, the increasing availability of
alternative methods for federal handling of multiple party litiga-
tion may indicate that the class action is increasingly less likely to
be considered "superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy."
20 5
1. Snyder, Zahn and Aggregation
The minimum amount in controversy required to gain access
to the federal courts is not mandated by the Constitution. No-
where in the Constitution is there mention of any monetary limita-
tion attached to federal court jurisdiction.20 6 However, ever since
the Judiciary Act of 1789, there has always been a statutorily-set
minimum amount in controversy requiremneAL for various types of
cases.20 7 Today, the jurisdictional amount requirement in these
cases is set forth in two succeeding federal statutes.0 8 A raft of
other specific statutes grant jurisdiction without reference to juris-
dictional amount.20 9
The recognized purpose of this requirement, where controlling,
is to restrict access to the lower federal courts in central types of
cases so as to reduce court congestion. 2 10 In addition, maintenance
202. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
203. U.S. (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1973)).
204. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (1973)
(42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
205. Amended Rule 23(b) (3).
206. 1 MOORE § 90(1).
207. The jurisdictional amount was originally fixed at $500 by the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. In
1887, it was increased to $2000. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552,
and in 1911 to $3000. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091,
and in 1958 it was increased to the present $10,000 figure. Act of July
25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
And 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different states
(2) citizens of a state, and foreign states or citizens or sub-
jects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different states and in which foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
209. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78v (securities); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (antitrust);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1325-35 (admiralty, bankruptcy, and statutory interpleader),
and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).
210. S. REP. NO. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
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of a monetary minimum for access is thought to keep trivial cases
out of federal court.
2 11
The jurisdictional amount question is a crucial one. Failure to
meet the requisite dollar figure is a substantive jurisdictional de-
fect which cannot be waived; the federal court is powerless to hear
the case even if both sides desire the federal forum for resolution of
their dispute. When a single plaintiff is suing a single defendant
on a single cause of action, the amount question is simply an
either/or determination; but when multiple parties are involved
the question becomes more complex. The relevant point here is
whether class members can aggregate their comparatively small in-
dividual claims to meet the ten thousand dollar figure or if they
are required to each meet it individually.
Under original Rule 23, aggregation was allowed only in a
true class action.2 12 With both the hybrid and the spurious actions,
each class member had to satisfy the then-prevailing jurisdictional
amount in controversy separately.213 Under the 1966 revision and
its purported eradication of the tri-partite distinctions, the question
arose whether aggregation was universally permissible once the
validity of the class itself was established. It was thought that
the logical result of the shift in emphasis from jural relationships
to appropriateness would be uniform approval of aggregation in all
class actions.214  Undeniably, the spirit, if not the letter of
amended Rule 23 calls for this result.
And yet, the United States Supreme Court in Snyder held that
aggregation was not proper under amended Rule 23 when plain-
tiffs are suing on the basis of separate and distinct claims joined
only by common questions of law or fact.215 Thus, unless pro-
ceeding on a non-jurisdictional amount federal cause of action, to
211. Id.
212. This rule was known formally as the Pinel doctrine,
... when two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct de-
mands unite in a simple suit, it is essential that the demand of
each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several
plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have
a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests
collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.
Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916). The adoption of original Rule 23
did nothing to vitiate this doctrine. See, e.g., Knowles v. War Damage
Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (true); Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steel
Corp., 143 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1944) (hybrid); Central Mexico Light &
Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940).
213. See note 212 supra.
214. See, e.g., Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving
Difficulties and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MIN. L.
REV. 509, 515 (1967).
215. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
successfully maintain a (b) (3) class action each class member is re-
quired to meet the jurisdictional amount. Snyder and its pro-
geny216 mark a conceptual return to the much-maligned classifica-
tions of original Rule 23 which were targeted for removal by
amended Rule 23. Thereunder, the courts appear to be faced with
the anomalous task of first determining if class treatment is appro-
priate under amended Rule 23 (a) and then looking to original Rule
23 to see if the class is true, hybrid or spurious so as to determine
the availability of aggregation. 217
In Snyder, plaintiff owned 2000 shares of stock in a life insur-
ance company. Each share was valued at $2.63. Those in control
of the company's board of directors sold their stock to another life
insurance company at $7.00 per share. Plaintiff claimed damages
as a result of this transaction totalling $8,740. Since this was less
than the jurisdictional amount, Snyder sought to aggregate her
claim with those of the other 4000 shareholders in the class. The
circuit court 218 held the claims non-aggregable. In Snyder's com-
panion case,2i9 aggregation had been allowed for the claims of eight-
een thousand allegedly overcharged gas company customers.220
The Supreme Court decided in favor of non-aggregation. 221
Justice Fortas, in dissent, argued that aggregation is the only
just way to determine the true amount in controversy in a class ac-
tion. Since the class action is a device employed in order to repre-
sent the claims of the entire class, it is only fair that all of the
claims together be considered as the amount in controversy. 22 2 Jus-
tice Fortas decried the majority's interpretation which served to
"vitiate a significant part of the reform intended to be accom-
plished by the Amendment of Rule 23. ''223
Snyder has had a stagnating effect on (b)(3) class actions, 224
216. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1970); Lonquist
v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970).
217. "It was precisely this morass that the 1966 amendments to Rule
23 sought to avoid." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 343 (1969) (Fortas,
J. dissenting).
218. 390 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1968).
219. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd
sub. noma., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
220. Id.
221. Justice Black's opinion for the majority emphasized five points:
(1) heavy reliance on the Pinel doctrine; (2) the Federal Rules by their
own mandate cannot be used to extend the jurisdiction of the federal
courts; (3) congressional silence on the matter when using the phrase
"matter in controversy" in the jurisdictional amount statute impliedly
adopted the traditional aggregation rule; (4) the need to limit the case
load of the federal courts; and (5) preservation of state court authority
in this area. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332-42 (1969).
222. 394 U.S. 332, 345-48 (1969) (Fortas, J. dissenting).
223. Id. at 354.
224. For excellent treatment of this subject see Strausberg, Class Ac-
tions and Jurisdictional Amount: Access to a Federal Forum-A Post Sny-
der v. Harris Analysis, 22 AmEa. U.L. REv. 79 (1972). For a suggestion
of how this affect of Snyder might be mitigated, see Comment, The Via-
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which has been reinforced quite recently by the Zahn decision. In
Zahn, two hundred owners of lakefront property on the New York-
Vermont border brought a class action against an alleged polluter
of the lake. The named plaintiffs each satisfied the ten thousand
dollar jurisdictional amount but not every unnamed class mem-
ber was shown to have suffered ten thousand dollars of pollution
damages. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the case. 225
Thus, it is clear that the purpose of amended Rule 23-the protec-
tion of small individual claimants22 -has been crippled by this line
of cases.
2. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
227
After eight years of litigation, concern, not with the merits of
the case but rather with the matter of appropriateness of class sta-
tus and the discretion of the court under amended Rule 23, Eisen is
finally to be considered by the United States Supreme Court. The
in-court controversies as to these preliminary determinations span
the whole existence of amended Rule 23. Many of the new diffi-
culties born of the 1966 amendments are ripe for authoritative res-
olution when the Supreme Court reviews the Eisen III decision;
as Circuit Judge Oakes said: "on its face the opinion appears to
nullify much of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. ' '228 A brief look at the
Eisen history is therefore appropriate here.229 The plaintiff, an in-
bility of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533,
554-55 (1972).
225. U.S. (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1973)), ajf'g,
F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g, 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
226. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
227. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (1973) (42
U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)). For a full historical citation, see note
12 supra. See Authors' Note, p. 460, supra.
228. 479 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J. dissenting from de-
nial of petition for rehearing en banc). Consider the issues certified for
review:
(1) Should class action maintainable under FED. R. Civ. P. 23
be dismissed because individual class representatives cannot afford
to pay for individual notice of its pendency to 2 million identifi-
able class members? (2) Is individual notice to 2 million identifi-
able class members required by due process or FED. R. CIv. P. 23,
where statute of limitations has run on damage claims of class,
so that their interest in electing exclusion from class is minimal?
(3) Is due process satisfied in class action maintained under FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 by adquacy of representation and published notice
rather than individual notice? (4) Is notice of pendency of class
action required in class action maintained under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (1) or (b)(2)? . . . Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, U.S.
(1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)) (grant of cer-
tiorari). See Authors' Note, p. 460, supra.
229. More detailed histories of Eisen can be found in any one of a
vestor in securities, brought a class action on behalf of all other
buyers and sellers of odd-lot shares on the New York Stock Ex-
change against two leading securities brokerage houses on the
ground that they had conspired to monopolize and fix prices in vio-
lation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A defense motion for dis-
missal was granted by District Judge Tyler. 230 Then, the Second
Circuit denied a motion to dismiss an appeal taken by Eisen. 211 On
that appeal, Circuit Judge Medina of the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded for further evidentiary hearings as to the propriety
of class status. 232 Judge Medina advised that Rule 23 be liberally
interpreted; 233 Chief Judge Lumbard, in dissent, characterized the
class action as a Frankenstein monster 34 and voted to affirm dis-
misal on grounds of unmanageability and impossibility of proper
notice.23 5 On remand, Judge Tyler then called for further informa-
tion from the parties.236 After receiving the required information,
he ruled that the suit was properly brought as a class action, or-
dered a notice scheme to be initiated and conducted a preliminary
hearing to work out procedural arid ad.... im..idv A
that "mini-hearing," the judge found that plaintiffs enjoyed a high
probability of success on the merits and ordered defendants to bear
ninety per cent of the notice costs.
238
In Eisen III, Judge Medina, for the Second Circuit, struck down
all of Judge Tyler's innovations. 239 In addition, he mandated,
without the slightest hint of equivocation, that individual notice
to readily identifiable class members 240 must be had regardless of
cost and plaintiff must pay these notice costs if he wishes to pro-
ceed in class form.241 In a further attack on Judge Tyler's use of
number of sources. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
1007-08, 1010 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (19 ) (42 U.S.L.W.
3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)); Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 428-33; Compare Brief for
Petitioner at 8-15 (for reversal), with Brief for Respondent at 3-21 (for
affirmance of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, U.S. (1973) (42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
230. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
231. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
232. 341 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
233. Id. at 563.
234. Id. at 570.
235. Id. at 572.
236. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
237. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
238. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
239. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (19 ) (42 U.S.L.W.
3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
240. This meant 2 million odd lot purchases identifiable through the
computer tape records of the defendants, who willingly offered to furnish
them to plaintiff. This defense effort to compel plaintiff to comply with
strict notice can operate as a succesful "defense" wholly unrelated to the
merits if plaintiff is unable financially to comply. See note 183 and accom-
panying text supra.
241. 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (19
(42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)).
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the discretion vested in him 'by amended Rule 23, the court also
rejected the "mini-hearing" device. 242 By overriding all the dis-
cretionary devices employed by Judge Tyler to allow the class ac-
tion to continue, Judge Medina, who five years earlier reversed dis-
missal of this action and advised liberal interpretation of the
Rule,243 held the class suit here unmanageable and dismissed it.
In so doing, he reemphasized the heavy due process influence on no-
tice requirements under Rule 23 and criticized Judge Tyler's exer-
cise of discretion in this regard.
244
Now the matter awaits Supreme Court decision. 44a If the
Snyder-Zahn line of reasoning carries over to the consideration of
Eisen, the Court's resolution of these matters could well spell the
end of social-remedy (b) (3) class actions. On the other hand, an au-
thoritative reaffirmation of the flexible approach exemplified by
Judge Tyler would do much to resurrect the hopes of class action
proponents. In either event, Eisen III is reflective of the increase
of potential obstacles to class action access to federal courts.
3. Alternative Methods of Handling Group Litigation
One of the requirements of amended Rule 23(b) (3) is that
the class device qualify as the superior method among available
alternatives for fairly and adequately handling the controversy at
hand.2 45 Four alternative methods which have received recogni-
tion 246 are as follows: intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24; separate individual actions with an agreement for
test case disposition of one of them; separate individual actions
under the mutually agreed upon application of collateral estop-
242. Hand in hand with this rejection, the court also ruled Judge Ty-
ler's fluid recovery proposal (i.e. to use part of the recovery left unclaimed
to reduce future prices of odd-lot transactions) improper. Id. at 1018. For
further treatment of this and other damage distribution subjects, see West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404
U.S. 871 (1971); Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Malina, The Search for the Pot
of Gold-Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases,
41 ANTrrruTsT L.J. 301 (1972); Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial
Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b) (3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972);
Pomerantz, supra note 1; Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage
Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MicH. L. REv. 338 (1971).
243. 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
244. 479 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. (19
(42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973)). For a recent case involving simi-
lar issues, see Greenfield v. Village Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
244a. See Authors' Note, p.460, supra.
245. Amended Rule 23(b) (3).
246. See Fullam, supra note 147, at 376.
pel; and separate individual actions with pretrial consolidation
under § 1407 on multidistrict litigation.
247
Obviously, none of these methods really serves to reduce the
number of suits filed since they all require separate assertion of
individual claims. If the claims are too small, they cannot be as-
serted feasibly on an individual basis. If they are numerous, an
overburdening multiplicity of suits would result. 248 And yet,
for either policy or practical reasons endemic to a particular case,
one of these may prove superior to the class action.
The only point to be made here is that if (b) (3) class actions
continue to curry the disfavor indicated by cases like Snyder, Zahn
and Eisen III, these alternate procedural methods may be the only
means by which "class" members can gain a federal forum. By
implication, the greater the antipathy for the (b) (3) class device,
the more likely that one of these alternatives will be considered
the superior way of handling large group claims. Thus, if these
options are unattractive or infeasible to a particular group of po-
tential plaintiffs wronged by a common defendant and the class
action route is foreclosed, federal court will have to be ruled out
entirely for certain types of group claims.
Analytically, a major step in understanding the class action
device is isolation of the interplay between the impetus for the
1966 revisions and the intended achievements of those revisions.
Conceptually, Pennsylvania's Procedural Rules Committee is in a
position, as regards Rule 2230, similar to that of the federal Advi-
sory Committee in 1966 whose task it was to rewrite original Rule
23 within the scope of that interplay. There are differences though.
Our State's Committee has the advantage of having observed the
process in which original Rule 23 was amended, the expectations
surrounding that amendment and eight years of federal class ac-
tion experience under the amendment. Concomitantly, it is at a
disadvantage in that our courts have had so little experience with
real class actions; no long-lived policy of encouragement of use of
the device exists; and inherent state jurisdictional limits are pres-
ent which played no part in the federal class action experience
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. 1972). Among other things, this statute
on multidistrict litigation permits the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Liti-
gation to temporarily transfer to one forum, for pretrial discovery pur-
poses, related cases pending in several districts in order to promote con-
venience and judicial economy. Hereunder, one or more class actions can
be transferred to a single court for pre-trial discovery purposes. For a
detailed handbook on how this extraordinary feat is to be accomplished,
see MANUAL FoR COMPLEX LITIGATION (January 1, 1973). For a discussion
of the Judicial Panel's function and citation to cases handled under its
aegis, see Handler, supra note 5, at 15-17, Peterson and McDermott, Multi-
district Litigation: New Forms of Judicial Administration, 56 A.B.A.J. 737
(1970).
248. See Fullam, supra note 147, at 376.
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upon which our present rule is modeled. However, with the recent
indications of lessened class action accessability to federal courts,
the time is now for re-examination and modernization of our pro-
cedural rule governing class actions. As indicated in stark detail
in the next section, the prospect of bringing a class action in the
Pennsylvania courts is not an enviable task for anyone involved-
the courts, the attorneys or the parties.
III. PENNSYLVANIA CLASS ACTIONS
A. Introduction
Rule 2230 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure was en-
acted in 1940 and became effective in 1941.249 It was patterned
after the original federal class action rule, enacted in 1938, but
eliminated the true-hybrid-spurious class forms delineated in sub-
section A of the federal rule and also subsection B relating to sec-
ondary actions by shareholders.2 50 Pennsylvania thus became one
of twenty-six states to pattern their class action rules or statutes
after the 1938 federal prototype251 and one of four states to elim-
inate the tripartite categories. 252 The Rules Committee note to
Rule 2230 states that it was intended to adopt the prior practice
under Pennsylvania Equity Rule 16 and Federal Rule 23.253 Inso-
249. See note 20 supra.
250. See note 24 supra for the text of the federal rule, Shareholder de-
rivative actions, though technically class actions, are also subject to
P.R.C.P. 1506-08.
251. Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 7 (Supp. 1968), EQurrY R. 31 (1958);
Alaska: ALAS. R. Crv. P. 23; Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN., CHANCERY R.
23 (1953); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-123 (Supp. 1967); Hawaii:
HAWAII R. Civ. P. 23; Idaho: IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23; Iowa: IowA CODE ANN.
IOWA R. Civ. P. 23 (1951); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (1964);
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT., Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.01, 23.02; Louisiana: LA. CODE
Crv. PRoc. ANN. art. 591, 592 (West. 1960); Maine: ME. R. Civ. P. 23
(1968); Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN., GEN. CT. R. 298 (1964); Missouri:
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.070 (1964); Montana: MONT. REV. CODE ANN.,
MONT. R. Civ. P. 23 (1964); Nevada: NEv. REV. STAT., NEv. R. Civ. P. 23
(1967); New Jersey: N.J.R. CIv. P. 4:36 (1968); New Mexico: N.M.R. CIV.
P. 23 (1949); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, R. 23 (1969); North
Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE, N.D. R. Civ. P. 23 (1960); Rhode Island: R.I.R.
Civ. P. 23 (1966); South Dakota: S.D. CoMP. LAws § 15-6-23 (1967); Texas:
VERNON'S TEx. R. Civ. P. 42; Utah: UTAH CODE ANN., UTAH R. Civ. P. 23
(1953); West Virginia: W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23; Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN.,
Wyo. R. Crv. P. 23 (1958).
252. See Maine, Rhode Island, and North Carolina citations in note 3
supra.
253. "This subdivision adopts the practice under Pennsylvania Equity
Rule 16 and F.R.C.P. No. 23(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, in pro-
viding for a class suit where the members of a class are so numerous as
to make it impractical to join all as parties ... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2230 (1967).
far as Rule 2230 was made actionable both at law and in equity,25 4
however, the need for Equity Rule 16 diminished and it was later
suspended in 1952.255 Because of its similarity, the 1938 federal rule
and the decisions interpreting it have continued to exert persua-
sive authority in Pennsylvania.2 6 Unfortunately, Pennsylvania's
lower courts responded to the federal experience with such alacrity
that they appear to have engrafted the true-hybrid-spurious class
categories back onto Rule 2230, making it in effect a near perfect
facsimile of the 1938 Federal Rule with all its concomitant prob-
lems. 257 This matter was further complicated in 1966 when the
Federal Rules Committee amended Rule 23 in response to criticism
of the "jural relations" created by the 1938 rule,25 1 leaving Penn-
sylvania and the other states who followed suit to grapple with the
problems created by these seemingly innocuous class categories.
Many of of the problems to be encountered in the application
of Rule 2230 also stem from the fact that state class actions are
still "in a period of evolution and have not reached any definitive
form. '25 9 To this date the number of class actions instituted in
Pennsylvania pursuant to Rule 2230 are relatively few and of
these the large majority have never reached the appellate level.
As a result, the discussion and conclusions contained in this part of
the article rely heavily upon lower court decisions with some sup-
porting authority from the federal cases.
254. See RULES COMMrITEE NOTE to P.R.C.P. 1501; P.R.C.P. 2226 (join-
der of parties rules, including Rule 2230 apply to any civil action or pro-
ceeding at law or in equity); Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391
(Pa. C.P. 1967); Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. Rep.
142, 155 (Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d
688 (1956).
255. See PA. EQUITY 1536, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1501 (1967). See
generally Farrel v. Livingston Apts., Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C.2d 280 (Leh. C.P.
1951) wherein a class action was instituted pursuant to PA. EQUITY 16.
256. See, e.g., Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C.2d 212, 213 (Mercer C.P.
1952); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Works, 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949).
"We look for guidance to the Federal Courts upon whose Procedural Rule
23(a), P.R.C.P. 2230 (a) was based." Guter v. Donaldson Iron Works, 69
Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). See also Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb.
Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
257. See, e.g., Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118,
301 A.2d 93 (1973); Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 15 Pa. D. &
C.2d 568 (Daunh. C.P. 1967); Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513
(Alleg. C.P. 1956); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa.
D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212
(Mercer C.P. 1952).
258. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
259. 3 GOODRIcH-AMRAM PA. PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE, § 2230(a)-1.
[hereinafter cited as GOODRIcH-AMRAM]. See generally Oas v. Common-
wealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
At a time in the history of the law when the courts are being
innundated with class suits brought by all kinds of organizations
with a penchant for social and economic reforms on a gigantic
scale, when the courts, rather than the legislative process, are be-
ing used to change things governmental and when the caseloads
are being increased for all courts almost daily, lines must be
drawn to keep class actions within reasonable bounds.
Id. at 126, 301 A.2d at 97.
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B. Prerequisites to Class Formation
In Pennsylvania the determination as to whether a class action
is proper rests entirely within the discretion of the court. o0 Rule
2230, however, is rather abbreviated and offers the courts few, if
any, guidelines by which they can determine whether a pur-
ported class is properly constituted and represented or whether the
action is properly initiated. Nevertheless, the few cases to ad-
dress these issues have added some substance to the rule and do
permit the formulation of a number of conclusions.
The court's first consideration is whether a legally recognizable
"class" is presented. Nowhere in Rule 2230 is a class defined. The
courts have nevertheless constructed a number of prerequisites to
the formation of a proper class. The fact that an assemblage con-
sists of persons so numerous as to make joinder impracticable
will not of itself establish the existence of a class.26 1 It must first be
established to the satisfaction of the court that the purported class
members share a common cause, right, or privilege in the subject
matter of the litigation,262 and hold the same legal position with
respect to those rights or liabilities.263 It is further required that
the relief sought or defended against be common to all the class
members. 26 4 However, as shall later become evident, Pennsylvania
260. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967);
Wiley v. Umbal, 7 Fayette L.J. 246, 248 (Pa. C.P. 1944). Cf. Kern v. Du-
quesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg. C.P. 1958); Farrel v.
Livingston Apts., Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C. 280 (Leh. C.P. 1951) (question of
fact). See generally Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941);
Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 30 F. Supp. 173 (D.S.D. 1939), aff'd, 113
F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
261. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE, § 2230.3
(1962) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
262. See Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 283, 122 A.2d 688
(1956); Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93
(1973); Herrera v. Burke, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 73 (Del. C.P. 1970).
263. See Jones v. Gillespie, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (Phila. C.P. 1973);
Stansbury v. School Dist. of Chester, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (Ches. C.P.
1970);. Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg. C.P.
1958); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). Cf. Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 45 Erie Co.
L.J. 334 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (defense of laches and estoppel applicable to some
of the members but not as to others).
264. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Gericke v. Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945); Ashcom
v. Westmont, 298 Pa. 203, 148 A. 112 (1929); The Honorable Raymond
Pace Alexander v. The Honorable A. Evans Kephart, 10 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 559, A.2d (1973); Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973). "The principle requirement of such
a lawsuit is that . . . the relief sought is common to all of the members
of the class described." Id. at 125, 301 A.2d at 97.
courts in their attempt to catalogue class actions as either true, hy-
brid, or spurious, have in some instances been forced to retreat
from a strict application of the basic common interest test.265
A taxpayers' action in equity wherein a class of municipal tax-
payers seek to enjoin the wrongful expenditure or waste of muni-
cipal funds is often cited as the classic example of an action satis-
fying the common interest requirements.2 6 Stockholders' deriva-
tive suits are given similar recognition: 267 in contrast, a class ac-
tion in equity on behalf of a number of property owners seeking to
compel a land developer to perform the various covenants con-
tained in their deeds was summarily dismissed as improper for lack
of common interest.268 Also, an action on behalf of discharged
employees seeking reinstatement by their former employer was
found improper because of the conflicting interest inherent in a sen-
iority list.269 Although these examples are illustrative of the man-
ner in which the common interest has been applied in Pennsyl-
vania, a caveat should be entered, for each of the cited cases where-
in the class was dismissed as improper there are cases affirming
the propriety of the class in virtually identical fact situations.
270
When satisfied that the purported class possesses the requisite
common interest, the court's next determination is whether the
class members are so numberous as to make joinder of the parties
"impracticable." What number of persons will make such action
impracticable is not specified in Rule 2230 and again this matter
rests within the discretion of the courts.27 1 In determining the
number of class members the court should exclude those who have
made a settlement or compromise with the party opposing the class
action, but should not deny the right of the remaining class mem-
bers to bring an action even when a majority of the class mem-
bers have made such an arrangement with the opposing party.
2 72
265. See note 383 and accompanying text infra.
266. See Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 227
A.2d 619 (1967); Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221
A.2d 128 (1966); Gericke v. Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945);
Leech v. Meadville and Skyline Motors Aviation Service, 12 Craw. Co. L.J.
139 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
267. See Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182, 282 A.2d 714 (1971). See
generally Edgerton v. Armour & Co., 94 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Cal. 1950);
Note, Shareholders Derivative Suits, Are They Class Actions?, 42 IowA L.
REv. 568 (1957).
268. See Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d 688
(1956); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952). But see
Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph. C.P.
1967); Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
269. See Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg.
C.P. 1958), aff'd, 396 Pa. 279, 152 A.2d 682 (1959). Cf. Guter v. Donaldson
Iron Works, 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). But see Federation of
Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956).
270. See notes 268-69 supra.
271. See note 12 supra. See generally Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Reiner,
45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942).
272. See Farrell v. Livingston Apts, Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C. 280 (Leh. C.P.
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Once the court has formulated some idea as to the number in the
class it must consider the degree of difficulty in securing warrants
of attorney and authorization from each class member if it is a
plaintiff class and the question of effecting service on the members
of a defendant class.273 If satisfied that compliance with these pre-
requisites to joinder would be excessively burdensome then joinder
will be deemed impracticable. Though the courts have uniformly
applied the same criteria in making this determination it remains
difficult to ascertain a minimum number of class members which if
equalled or exceeded would make joinder impractical. Suffice it
to say that fifty class members would probably be sufficient to
maintain a class action in most of Pennsylvania's lower courts.
7 4
After having established that the class members share a com-
mon interest in the subject matter of the litigation and are so nu-
merous as to make joinder impracticable it remains to be deter-
mined whether the purported class representative "adequately rep-
resent" the class members.27 5 Formal authorization by the indi-
vidual class members to the purported representatives is not re-
quired,276 nor are the representatives required to give notice to
the class members of the pending action; however, the courts may
1951); GOODmiCH-AMRAm § 2230(a)-1. See generally Atwood v. National
Bank, 115 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1940).
273. See ANDERSON § 2230.8. Cf. Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc.,
15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph. C.P. 1957). See generally Glirva v. United
States Steel Corp., 338 Pa. 149, 12 A.2d 784 (1940) which illustrates prob-
lems of securing warrants of attorney.
274. See, e.g., Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P.
1967) (82 members was sufficient); Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29
Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (Erie C.P. 1962) (16 members was not sufficient);
Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 319
(Pa. C.P. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 418 Pa. 221, 210 A.2d 264 (1965)
(50 members sufficient); Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co.
L. Rep. 142 (Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d
688 (1956) (45 members sufficient); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212
(Mercer C.P. 1952) (28 members insufficient).
275. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93
(1973); Montgomery Township Citizens Ass'n. v. Montgomery Township
School Dist., 3 Adams Co. L.J. 15 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Kern v. Duquesne Brew-
ing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg. C.P. 1958), aff'd, 396 Pa. 279, 152
A.2d 682 (1959). See generally Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,
361 U.S. 683 (1961).
276. See Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 142
(Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d 688 (1956);
ANDERsoN § 2230.12. Cf. Crane v. Liquor Control Bd., 50 Dauph. Co. Rep.
401 (Pa. C.P. 1941). But see Glass v. Dean Coal Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
657 (Camb. C.P. 1956). See generally Templeton v. Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry., 7 F.R.D. 116 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Schatte v. International Alliance of
Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1950) (but representative cannot
bring in new counsel over objection of class members).
in their discretion require such notice.27 7 Nevertheless, it must be
established to the satisfaction of the court that the class repre-
sentatives have no interests adverse to he class 21 8 and that the re-
lief sought by them is in its nature beneficial to those whom they
undertake to represent.279 As can readily be determined from a
number of Pennsylvania cases, a dispute as to the respective shares
to which the class representatives and class members are entitled
does not create such an adverse interest. 28 0 In contradistinction, an
adverse interest was presented in Penn Galvanizing v. Philadel-
phia28 1 wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed a pur-
ported class bill on the grounds that the representative prayed for
relief which would effect a depletion of the treasury in which the
other taxpayers had a vested interest.
28 2
An additional consideration in determining the adequacy of
representation was espoused by a number of federal courts which
recognized that a great disparity between the number of represen-
tatives and the number in the class tends to have a prophylactic
effect on the fair trial of all the issues.213 Moreover, there ap-
pears to be authority, both federal and state, to the effect that the
court in the final analysis may dismiss an otherwise adequate rep-
resentative in favor of one who is better able to represent the inter-
ests of the class. 28 4 However, it is important to note that whenever
a class action is dismissed on the grounds of inadequate represen-
tation or other impropriety, the action is dismissed only as to the
class and may continue as to the individual claims of the represen-
tatives or record plaintiffs.
285
277. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967);
Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 142 (Pa. C.P. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d 688 (1956). See generally
York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
278. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d 688 (1956);
Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
See generally Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.
1939).
279. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93
(1973).
280. See, e.g., Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P.
1967); Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph.
C.P. 1957); Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513 (Alleg. C.P. 1956);
Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg.
C.P. 1956). But see Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
See generally Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.
1939).
281. 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511 (1957).
282. Id. at 379, 130 A.2d at 516.
283. See Weeks v. Bareco, 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Pelelas v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940).
284. See Wiley v. Umbel, 7 Fayette Co. L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
285. See Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg.
C.P. 1958); GOODRICH-AMRAM § 2230(a)-1. Contra, Schlanger v. Borough
of West Berwick, 261 Pa. 605, 104 A. 764 (1918). "A taxpayer's bill is
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Though a class may be presented which comports with all the
above prerequisites regarding class formation, there remain a num-
ber of recognized exceptions to the use of the class action device
which preclude its application to specific actions. Suits by or
against a union, trade association, or other unincorporated associ-
ation cannot be brought as class suits under Rule 2230.28 6 Such
actions are now subject to the provisions of the Unincorporated As-
sociations as Parties Rules.2 8 7 There is some authority that this
proscription may not be applicable if it is established that the cause
of action is owned not by the association but rather by the associ-
ation's members in their individual capacities who expressly
delegate their rights to the association. 28 In addition to the pro-
scription against unincorporated associations, Rule 2230 is also
subject to the established principle that where a remedy or method
of procedure is expressly provided for specific actions, such remedy
or procedure is exclusive.2 9 This principal was aptly illustrated
by the court in Frank v. Mobile Oil Corporation290 wherein a group
of residents and property owners purported to constitute a class un-
der Rule 2230 in order that individual class members could later
intervene in an appeal to the local zoning board. The Common-
wealth Court dismissed this contention by noting that the zoning
statutes explicitly provide that all appellants before the board
must file individual challenges thereby precluding the application
of the class action device to such proceedings.291
essentially a class bill and can be filed only in the common interest of
all taxpayers of the municipality." Id. at 607, 104 A. at 766.
286. See RULES COMMIrrEE NoTE to PA. R. Civ. P. 2230; Montgomery
Township Citizens Ass'n. v. Montgomery Township School Dist., 3 Adams
Co. L.J. 15 (Pa. C.P. 1961). This proscription may not be circumscribed
by bringing the action in the name of the association's president. Fitzgerald
v. Kriss, 10 F.R.D. 51 (N.D.N.Y. 1950). But see Turnstall v. Bhd. of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945) which illus-
trates a different rule for federal class actions.
287. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2151-75 (1967).
288. See Philadelphia Council of Property Owners v. City of Philadel-
phia, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (Phila. C.P. 1969). See generally National Hair-
dressers & Cosmetologists Ass'n v. County of Philadelphia, 3 F.R.D. 199
(D. Del. 1943).
289. See Knup v. Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350, 126 A.2d 399 (1956); Frank
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 462, 296 A.2d 300 (1973).
See generally Smith v. Stark Trucking, 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943).
290. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 462, 296 A.2d 300 (1973).
291. Id. at 466, 296 A.2d 303; accord, Valenza v. Township of Upper
Moreland, 95 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 85 (Pa. C.P. 1972). It should be noted
that some statutes expressly provide for the class action device rather than
preclude its application. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-509 (Supp.
1973) (Pennsylvania Blue Sky Laws).
C. Initiating the Class Action
In addition to the questions of whether a class is properly con-
stituted and represented there remains the question of whether
the action was properly initiated. It may be stated with certainty
that in Pennsylvania there is no recognized format for pleading
or averring a class action. The existing case law is generally con-
flicting and leaves the practitioner in a quandry as to the factual
averments required for the maintenance of a class suit.
At the outset the record parties should first aver in their com-
plaint or bill that a class action is being instituted and that they are
the representatives of the class.29 2 Although it may be appropriate
to caption the complaint as a class action, 293 this is not required,
and the class averment may be placed in the body of the pleading
because the complaint as a whole will be considered in determin-
ing whether a class action is averred.2 94 It is significant to note
that a number of Pennsylvania's courts have overlooked the failure
of the class representative to make a simple class averment where
it was clear from the pleadings that the party intended to institute
a class action.
295
The form or wording of the requisite class averment is not de-
fined in Rule 2230, and any form or style which indicates that the
record parties are acting in a representative capacity is sufficient. 296
This matter was addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia,297 wherein it was stated that:
In a class action the complaint should be so titled and the
pleadings so framed as to identify it as a class action and
to give some indication of the class being represented ....
The complaint should be such that its character as a class
action rather than an individual suit be manifest on its
292. See Wilson v. Blaine, 262 Pa. 367, 105 A. 555 (1918); Schlanger
v. Borough of West Berwick, 261 Pa. 605, 104 A. 264 (1918); Crane v. Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Bd., 50 Dauph. Co. Rep. 401 (Pa. C.P. 1941).
293. See, e.g., Alexander v. Kephart, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559,
A.2d (1973); Kersaw v. Township of Upper Merion, 83 Montg. Co.
L. Rep. 194 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
294. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Herrera v. Burke, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 73 (Del. C.P. 1970); Jones
v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Kershaw v. Township
of Upper Merion, 83 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 194 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
295. See, e.g., Huyett v. Reading, 57 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 73 (Pa. C.P.
1965); Wiley v. Umbel, 7 Fayette Co. L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1944). "Although
he did not expressly say so, he may be regarded as acting in behalf of
himself and numerous others." Id. at 248.
296. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); accord, Baldwin v. Rose Tree Fox Hunting Club, 451 Pa. 538, 304
A.2d 505 (1973) ("on behalf of themselves and the members of the Rose
Tree Fox Hunting Club who were active on December 16, 1963, and who
have remained so thereafter, plus the heirs of such plaintiffs dying since
that date"); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956) ("for themselves and in behalf of all salaried
employees of the defendant included in the bargaining unit").
297. 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511 (1957).
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face to a defendant and to the court.
298
The court then noted that these minimal pleading requirements are
not merely formalistic and that a class action should not be in-
ferred in their absence.299 The reasons given for this uncomprom-
ising position were twofold: first, the consequences to a party op-
posing a class suit are generally far more devastating than in an
individual action; and second, Rule 2230 (b) prescribes special rules
regarding discontinuance, compromise, and dismissal which are at
variance with those applicable to an individual suing or defending
in his own behalf.
0
Beyond the minimal requirements prescribed by the supreme
court, the lower courts appear to be in discord as to what additional
factual averments need be offered in support of the propriety of
a class action. 10 ' Anderson suggests that beyond the averment of a
class action there are no other variations in the parties pleadings
until such time as the opposing party challenges the propriety of
the class action and only then should the class representative be
put to the task of alleging facts in support of the class action.
02
This proposition may well be justified in light of the fact that to
this date there has been no definitive statement in Pennsylvania
regarding the right of the court sua sponte to determine the pro-
priety of a purported class action. 03 The federal experience under
the 1938 class rule is also of no avail; although, it appears that un-
der the 1966 federal rule the courts were empowered to make such
a determination on their own motion.
0 4
Irrespective of the present state of the law, one may justifiably
298. Id. at 376, 130 A.2d at 515; accord, Wilson v. Blaine 262 Pa. 367,
105 A. 555 (1918) wherein the court stated with regard to a taxpayer's
bill in equity that "it must be filed in the name of and for the class."
Id. at 373, 105 A. at 577.
299. Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 377, 130 A.2d 511,
515 (1957). But see note 295 and accompanying text supra; Van Gemert
v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (individual action con-
verted into class action upon motion of opposing party).
300. Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 377, 130 A.2d 511,
515 (1957).
301. It should be noted that in Penn Galvanizing the supreme court
was addressing a taxpayer's class bill which by its very nature does not
require any additional averments. For a more detailed discussion of a tax-
payer's action, see note 357 and accompanying text infra.
302. ANDERSON § 2230.15.
303. It may be argued that by granting the courts full discretion in
class action matters, they were impliedly given the power to determine
these matters sua sponte. See Herrera v. Burke, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 73 (Del.
C.P. 1970) (class averment dismissed though complaint objected to for
other reasons).
304. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
conclude that most class actions, with a possible exception for cer-
tain actions in equity,30 5 will be challenged preliminarily as to
their propriety, thereby placing the matter before the court for de-
termination. At this point in the proceedings the courts have in-
variably required more than a simple class averment in the plead-
ings. For example, in Speizer v. McDowell National Bank 30 6 the
class action was dismissed for failure of the class representative
to plead facts indicating the number or identity of the class mem-
bers; 07 in Wiley v. Umbe 3 0 8 the action was dismissed for failure to
aver that the members of the class were too numerous to be
joined; and in Oas v. Commonwealth30 9 the court required an aver-
ment of facts sufficient to show that the class members have
the same or similar interests in the proceedings as the plaintiff. In
contrast to the simple class averment suggested by Anderson,
Goodrich-Amram's treatise suggests a form of class action pleading
which conforms to the averments heretofore required by the
courts.
/lle: comlaintJJ shoJ.uld#. be Iti-led as a class action,
identify the class, should state the number of members of
the class, should aver that they are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
and should allege facts showing the homogeneity of the
class.
3 10
Because the propriety of a class action is an issue within the
purview of the court's discretion, no one form of class action plead-
ing can be assured of averring all the facts deemed essential by
the individual courts. The omission of certain factual averments,
however, will often not result in the dismissal of the action, for the
305. Class actions in equity to compel the performance of an adminis-
trative duty have gone unchallenged as to the propriety of the class. See
Alexander v. Kephart, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559, A.2d (1973);
Fleishman's Vienna Model Bakery v. Torquato, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 490
(Dauph. C.P. 1956). Class actions in equity to enjoin the infringement
of constitutional rights also go unchallenged. See Jones v. Gillespie, 60
Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (Phila. C.P. 1973); Stansbury v. School Dist. of Chester,
50 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (Ches. C.P. 1970). But see Herrera v. Burke, 50
Pa. D. & C.2d 73 (Del. C.P. 1970).
306. 5 Mercer Co. L.J. 234 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
307. Accord, Herrera v. Burke, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 73 (Del. C.P. 1970);
Glass v. Dean Coal Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 657 (Camb. C.P. 1956); Guter
v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). But see
Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 71 Dauph. Co. Rep. 172 (Pa. C.P.
1957).
308. 7 Fayette Co. L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
309. 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
310. GOODRICH-AMRAM § 2230(a)-i. See, e.g., Korona v. Township of
Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. ReD. 142 (Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
385 Pa. 278, 122 A.2d 688 (1956), wherein suit was brought in behalf of
"all citizens, residents, property owners and taxpayers of Bensalem Town-
ship . . . , who bring this suit for their benefit and the benefit of all others
situated similarly to themselves, the number thereof being in excess of
45 and the class being so numerous as to render it inconvenient to include
them all as parties." Id. at 145.
Pennsylvania Class Actions
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
courts have evidenced a tendency to permit the amendment of an
otherwise insufficient complaint.311
D. Objections and Appeal
Nowhere in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is there
an express provision addressing the procedure to be followed in
challenging the propriety of a class action. Such a challenge must
therefore be made within the framework of existing rules. Insofar
as the class action was created by procedural rule, one can con-
clude that it may properly be challenged by any existing means
for alleging nonconformity to the rule. Pennsylvania courts do not
appear to be overly concerned with procedural niceties in this re-
gard and have rarely questioned the form in which a challenge
to a class action has been made. Such challenges have been raised
by preliminary objections, 12 petitions, 13 and motions for judg-
ment on the pleadings.
314
In an attempt to ascertain the most appropriate form or proce-
dure for opposing a class action it may first be more expedient to
determine what effect may be given a court's ruling that a class ac-
tion is improper. Though the courts generally rule that the ac-
tion is simply not in conformity with Rule 2230,315 it has been sug-
gested that such a determination is essentially equivalent to a find-
ing that there is a defect of nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties.316
Nonjoinder would appear to be an appropriate finding where the
class lacks the requisite commonality of interest or adequate repre-
311. See Gericke v. Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945);
Speizer v. McDowell Nat'l. Bank, 5 Mercer Co. L.J. 234 (Pa. C.P. 1961);
Glass v. Dean Coal Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 657 (Camb. C.P. 1956); Wiley
v. Umbel, 7 Fayette Co. L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1944). Cf. Oas v. Common-
wealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973) (only if time
of the essence). This approach to the matter appears to be more appropri-
ate in that P.R.C.P. 126 states that the procedural rules are to be given
"liberal" construction.
312. See, e.g., Philadelphia Council of Property Owners v. Philadelphia,
49 Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (Phila. C.P. 1969) (preliminary objection alleging
failure to comply with the requirements for bringing a class action);
Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 71 Dauph. Co. Rep. 172 (Pa. C.P.
1957) (preliminary objection alleging lack of jurisdiction over a spurious
class action); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952)
(preliminary objection alleging nonproper action under P.R.C.P. 2230).
313. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 191
(Pa. C.P. 1971).
314. See, e.g., Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 187
(Erie C.P. 1962).
315. See, e.g., Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 187
(Erie C.P. 1962); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952).
316. See AmDERsoN §§ 2230.16-17.
sentation, in the absence of which the class members must join in
the action in order to assert their individual rights. A finding of
misjoinder would similarly imply that the class is so broad as to
encompass questions of fact and law which are not common to all
the class members.
If a court order dismissing a class action is deemed equivalent
to a finding of nonjoinder,3 1 then the challenge to a class action
should be raised by preliminary objection pursuant to P.R.C.P.
1017(b).318 At this point the court may either exercise its discre-
tion and stay the proceedings until the absent class members have
been joined 19 or simply dismiss the class action. 320  Whether the
record parties or purported class representatives may prosecute
their individual claims upon dismissal of the class action depends
upon whether the absent class members were indispensable3 21 or
necessary 322 parties to the action. The absence of indispensable
parties goes to the court's jurisdiction and without their presence
the court can grant no relief and must dismiss the entire action;
3 23
however, in the absence of a necessary party the court will only
dismiss the action as to the nonjoined necessary parties and permit
the record parties to prosecute their individual claims.324 In either
event the dismissal is without prejudice to the parties bringing
a subsequent proper action.
325
317. See Farrel v. Livingston Apts., 79 Pa. D. & C. 280 (Leh. C.P.
1951); Wiley v. Umbel, 7 Fayette Co. L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1944) (a defect
of nonjoinder when raised resulted in the creation of a proper class).
318. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1017 (b) (5).
(b) Preliminary objections are available to any party and are lim-
ited to,
(5) a petition raising the defense of . . . nonjoinder of a nec-
essary party.
Though P.R.C.P. 1017 does not expressly provide for a preliminary objec-
tion to nonjoinder of indispensable parties, it has been interpreted to per-
mit such a preliminary objection. See Dorney Park Coaster Co. v. Stoudt
& Son, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 539 (Leh. C.P. 1970).
319. See Beck v. Kilroy, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 777 (West. C.P. 1954). Cf.
Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
320. See Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (Erie
C.P. 1962); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952).
321. An indispensable party is one whose interests are so connected
with the claims of the litigants that a final judgment cannot be entered
without impairing the individual's rights. See Tique v. Basalyga, 451 Pa.
436, 304 A.2d 119 (1973); Dozor Agency v. Rosenberg, 403 Pa. 237, 169
A.2d 771 (1961).
322. A necessary party is one whose interest in the controversy may
be protected by a limited court decree. See Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 405 Pa. 613, 177 A.2d 94 (1962); Hess v.
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 313 (Columb. C.P. 1957).
323. See Tique v. Basalyga, 451 Pa. 436, 304 A.2d 119 (1973); Eberhardt
v. Owens, 436 Pa. 320, 259 A.2d 683 (1969). See generally PA. R. Civ.
Pa. 1032(2).
324. See Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg.
C.P. 1958); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949). See generally Gavigan v. Local No. 97, Bookbinder's, 394 Pa. 400,
147 A.2d 147 (1959); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
325. See Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d
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Whether the absent class members in a purported class action
are indispensable or necessary is normally a function of the type
class action presented. As will later become evident, the hybrid
and spurious class forms will characteristically consist of only nec-
essary parties and the class representatives will be permitted to
prosecute their individual claims upon dismissal of the class. 26
This rationale may also be applicable to most true class actions
3 27
with one major exception-a representative taxpayer will not.be
permitted to prosecute an individual action upon a finding that the
taxpayers' class action was improper.2 8
If a court order dismissing a class action is deemed equivalent
to a finding of misjoinder,32 then a challenge may not be raised
by preliminary objection33 o but rather must be raised by petition
for severance of the parties. 31 If such a petition is approved by
the court it would have the effect of severing the claims of the
class representatives or record parties from the claims of the ab-
sent class members resulting in the dismissal of the action as to the
class.3 32 The record parties will again be permitted to prosecute
their individual claims subject to the necessary/indispensable party
93 (1973). See generally Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.
1941).
326. See notes 373 and 383 and accompanying text infra.
327. See note 352 and accompanying text infra.
328. See note 353 and accompanying text infra.
329. See Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 283, 122 A.2d 688
(1956); Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 191 (Pa. C.P.
1972); Fabiankovitz v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 81 Dauph. Co. Rep. 216, 220
(Pa. C.P. 1963); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D.
& C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956).
330. See Brandt v. American Business Association, 6 Bucks Co. L. Rep.
128 (Pa. C.P. 1956). But see Swartz v. United Natural Gas Co., 3 Mercer
Co. L.J. 174 (Pa. C.P. 1958) wherein a preliminary objection was treated
as a petition for severance. In point of fact the PA. RULES Crv. P. make
no provision for raising in the pleadings the objection of misjoinder of
parties. See Sugarman v. City of Hazleton, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 677 (Luz.
C.P. 1955).
331. See PA. R. Civ. P. 213(b); Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385
Pa. 283, 122 A.2d 688 (1956); Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co.
L. Rev. 191 (Pa. C.P. 1972); Melnick v. Euler, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 782 (Phila.
C.P. 1956); Sugarman v. Hazleton, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 677 (Luz. C.P. 1954).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation, 75 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 334 (Pa.
C.P. 1959) (misjoinder may be raised by motion or rule); Eichelberger
v. Warner West Corp., 38 Del. Co. Rep. 369 (Pa. C.P. 1951) (misjoinder
raised by rule to show cause). A petition is also applicable to a class
of defendants who have been misjoined. See The Youth Center v. Ward
& Ward, 52 Luz. Co. L. Rep. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
332. See Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 283, 122 A.2d 688
(1956); Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 191 (Pa. C.P.
1972).
considerations outlined above.833 It should be noted, however, that
whereas a preliminary objection alleging nonjoinder itself consti-
tutes a pleading,3 4 a petition for severance does not; and the party
filing the petition is therefore not excused from properly plead-
ing.
33 5
The rules, statutes, and principles applicable to appeals in gen-
eral apply to class actions in the same manner as they apply to
non-class actions. There does exist a question whether in Pennsyl-
vania the proposed class may take a direct appeal from a court or-
der dismissing the class action. The uncertainty in this regard
stems from the fact that few appeals have been taken from such
orders.
The allowance of the appeal may first depend upon whether
the class action was opposed by preliminary objection or petition.
Where a preliminary objection is raised and sustained and the
complaint dismissed the order is appealable; 3 6 however, where
a preliminary objection is raised and sustained without dismiss-
ing the entire complaint, but rather only the class aspect of the
action, the order is considered interlocutory and, absent express
statutory authority3 7 generally not appealable prior to judg-
ment. 3 8 Nevertheless, there is a recognized exception to this lat-
ter proscription in cases where the order "so restricts the pleader
as virtually to put him out of court.3 83 9 It may be arguable that
this exception is applicable to the majority of class actions if the
claim of individual class representatives is so insignificant as to
virtually preclude its prosecution; however, it appears that this
contention has not yet been raised in Pennsylvania and it therefore
remains of dubious value.
Two other vehicles for appeal from an interlocutory order
may be of some significance in Pennsylvania class action litigation.
333. See Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg.
C.P. 1958), aff'd, 396 Pa. 279, 152 A.2d 682 (1959); Feliciano v. City of
Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 191 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
334. See Killian v. Allegheny County Distributors, 409 Pa. 344, 185 A.2d
517 (1962); PA. R. Crv. P. 1017.
335. See Sugarman v. Hazleton, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 677 (Luz. C.P. 1954).
336. See Penn Galvanizing Co. v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d
511 (1957); Buszinski v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 107 Pitts. L.J. 360 (Pa.
C.P. 1959).
337. See Winnet v. Brenner, 409 Pa. 105, 185 A.2d 318 (1962); Stadler
v. Borough of Mt. Oliver, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953); Genro, Inc. v.
International Chemical & Nuclear Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 60, 302 A.2d 466
(1973).
338. See James Banda, Inc. v. Virginia Manor Apts., Inc., 451 Pa. 408,
303 A.2d 925 (1973); West Homestead School Dist. v. Allegheny County
Bd. of School Directors, 440 Pa. 113, 269 A.2d 904 (1970); Stadler v. Bor-
ough of Mt. Oliver, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953). See generally All
American Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954).
339. See Local No. 163, Internat'l Distillery Workers v. Watkins, 417




An interlocutory order sustaining or dismissing a preliminary ob-
jection may be appealed when questions of jurisdiction are raised. 40
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized questions
of necessary or indispensable parties as jurisdictional in nature,
41
an order dismissing a class action on nonjoinder principles might
be appealable when there exists a bona fide question whether the
absent class members were necessary or indispensable parties to
the suit.3 42 An order dismissing a class action might also be ap-
pealed pursuant to the recently enacted Commonwealth Court Act
of 1970343 which confers upon the courts the discretionary power
to hear appeals from interlocutory orders when the order involves
"a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
matter. '3 44 Although the determination whether a class is prop-
erly constituted normally rests within the discretion of the court,
45
it has been suggested that the question may well be one of law in
certain cases34 6 and, therefore, subject to the discretionary provi-
sions of the Commonwealth Court Act.
E. Class Action Categories
As alluded to earlier in this article, Pennsylvania's courts have
engrafted the true-hybrid-spurious class designations of the 1938
Federal Rule onto Pennsylvania Rule 2230, despite their marked
absence in the Rule itself.3 47 Furthermore, these jural relations
340. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 672 (1953); Tique v. Bassalyga, 451
Pa. 436, 304 A.2d 119 (1973); Dozor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 403 Pa.
237, 169 A.2d 771 (1961); Lewandowski v. General Tel. Co., 223 Pa. Super.
476, 302 A.2d 478 (1973). A preliminary objection is the exclusive device
for raising jurisdictional questions. See Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co.,
417 Pa. 135, 208 A.2d 252 (1965).
341. See Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co.,
405 Pa. 613, 177 A.2d 94 (1962); Dozor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 403 Pa.
237, 169 A.2d 771 (1961). Cf. University Square No. 1, Inc. v. Marhoefer,
407 Pa. 257, 180 A.2d 427 (1962).
342. See generally Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 405 Pa. 613, 177 A.2d 94 (1962); Dozor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg,
403 Pa. 237, 169 A.2d 771 (1961).
343. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.501 (Supp. 1973).
344. Id. See generally Tarasi v. Settino, 223 Pa. Super. 158, 298 A.2d
903 (1972); Commonwealth v. Septa, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 128, 289
A.2d 784 (1972) (an appeal from an interlocutory order may be taken to
the appellate court having jurisdiction of final orders in such matters).
345. See note 260 supra.
346. See generally ANDEIsoN § 2230.2; 28 PA. LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA, PAR-
Tris § 5 (1960).
347. See note 257 supra.
have become pivotal considerations in state class action litigation.3 48
To this date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed
the possibility of refashioning Rule 2230 after the 1966 federal
model,349 nor has it taken the opportunity to make a definitive
statement regarding the applicability of these jural relationships
to state class actions. 50 Although the class designations were de-
leted from the 1966 federal rule they appear to remain a func-
tional part of Pennsylvania class actions.351
The "true" class action has been uniformly defined in the
1938 Federal Rule and in Pennsylvania as one in which the char-
acter of the right or liability sought to be enforced for or against
the class is "joint or common or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a mem-
ber of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it." '3 52  Its
outstanding characteristic is that the right or liability asserted is
common to the class members and not owned by or asserted against
each member individually. 53 Stated another way, to be a true
c1ass artion as distinguished frnm n hyb-vrirl or splhrin,,q actinn
there must be an absolute identity of rights and liabilities.354 Fur-
thermore, the relief sought must be for the benefit of the entire






349. It is worthy of note that in Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182,
282 A.2d 714 (1971) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania looked to the 1966
Federal Class Action Rule as an aid in determining the scope of Pennsyl-
vania derivative stockholders actions. However, the section of the 1966
rule to which the court referred was the successor to section 23 (b) of the
1938 rule which was never adopted in the first instance by Pennsylvania.
350. However, in Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 278, 122
A.2d 688 (1956), one of the few cases wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed the propriety of a class, the class was dismissed without
reference to possible implications of the class action categories. See also
Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511 (1957) where
the court considered the propriety of a taxpayer's class action without ref-
erence to its character as a true class action. But see Gericke v. Philadel-
phia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945).
351. See, e.g., Leich v. City of Meadville, 12 Craw. Co. L.J. 139 (Pa.
C.P. 1972); Philadelphia Council of Property Owners v. Philadelphia, 49
Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (Phila. C.P. 1969). However, a number of lower courts
have recently begun to determine class action questions without applying
the tripartite categories to the cases presented. See, e.g., Jones v. Gillespie,
60 Pa. D. & C.2d 575 (Phila. C.P. 1973); Stansbury v. School Dist. of Ches-
ter, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (Ches. C.P. 1970); Herrera v. Burke, 50 Pa. D.
& C.2d 73 (Del. C.P. 1970).
352. See note 24 supra. See also Federation of Salaried Unions v.
Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Callen v. Callen,
83 Pa. D. & C. 212, 214 (Mercer C.P. 1962).
353. See Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513, 516 (Alleg. C.P.
1956). See generally Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Engine-
men, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
354. Cf. Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
(1957); Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (Erie C.P.
1962) (true class improper because defense of laches and estoppel appli-
cable to some of the class members but not to others).
355. See Penn Galvanizing v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130 A.2d 511
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In Pennsylvania the taxpayers bill in equity, which is essen-
tially a true class action, was recognized years before the enact-
ment of Rule 2230 and is still a viable procedural device. 57 Such
an action must be instituted by one or more taxpayers in the com-
mon interest of all the taxpayers35 8 of a governmental unit to en-
join the wrongful expenditure of money or the wasting of assets
by the governmental authority.59 The taxpayer representative's
right to bring such a suit is not dependent upon a unique injury
to him,3 0 for his status as a taxpayer in the governmental unit
suffices for standing purposes.3 61 Nevertheless, a taxpayer may
sue in his own right when he is subjected to a specific or unique
injury,3 62 but he will not be granted relief when the common in-
terest of all the taxpayers would be affected. 3
The true class action is particularly suited to actions in equity,
though it may be used in actions at law,3 64 and, other than taxpay-
ers actions, has been used in Pennsylvania to compel the perform-
ance by an administrative officer of a statutory duty,365 to bring
(1957). See generally Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 234 F.
Supp. 985 (E.D. La. 1964).
356. See Gericke v. Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945); Wil-
son v. Blaine, 262 Pa. 367, 105 A. 555 (1918); Oas v. Commonwealth, 8
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973) (taxpayers action are today
subject to the provisions of Rule 2230); Leech v. City of Meadville, 12
Craw. Co. L.J. 139 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
357. See Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 227
A.2d 619 (1967); Loewin v. Shapiro, 389 Pa. 610, 133 A.2d 525 (1957); Oas
v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973); Leech
v. City of Meadville, 12 Craw. Co. L.J. 139 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
358. No relief can be granted upon such a class bill except upon a
ground which is common to all the class members. See Gericke v. Phila-
delphia, 355 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 233 (1945).
359. See note 357 supra. Such an action cannot be used to compel
the expenditure of funds. See Schlanger v. Borough of West Berwick, 261
Pa. 605, 607, 104 A. 764 (1918). One taxpayer is sufficient so long as the
action is on the behalf of all the taxpayers. See Downing v. School Dist.
of Erie, 360 Pa. 29, 61 A.2d 133 (1948). See generally Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
360. See Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963); Harris
v. Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 473, 149 A. 722 (1930).
361. See Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d
138 (1966); Downing v. School Dist. of Erie, 360 Pa. 29, 61 A.2d 133 (1948).
The taxpayer need not be a resident or elector. See Noonan v. Buchart
Engineering Corp., 72 York Co. L. Rec. 113 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
362. See Regan v. Stoddard, 361 Pa. 469, 65 A.2d 240 (1949); Mazet
v. Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. 548, 20 A. 693 (1890).
363. See City of Hazleton v. Hazleton Area School Dist., 442 Pa. 477,
276 A.2d 545 (1971); Wilson v. Blaine, 262 Pa. 367, 105 A. 555 (1918).
364. See generally GOODRICH-AMRAM 2230 (a) -7.
365. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 191
(Pa. C.P. 1972); Fleishman's Vienna Model Bakery v. Torquato, 12 Pa.
a stockholders derivative action,3 66 to enjoin discriminatory poli-
cies or the infringement of constitutional rights,3 67 and to contest
the constitutionality of laws.3 68 More extensive application of the
true class action was made in the federal courts under the 1938
Rule which was used by creditors to enforce the statutory liabil-
ity of bank stockholders,3 69 by riparian owners to insure an ade-
quate flow of water from a common source of supply,370 and by
mineral and royalty owners of undivided fractional interests against
their mineral lessee to recover damages for breach of contract. 71
Insofar as the definitional requirements of the true class action
under the 1938 Rule are the same in Pennsylvania, the foregoing
federal cases serve to illustrate the future potential of the true class
action in this state.
The "hybrid" class action has been defined in the 1938 Federal
Rule and in Pennsylvania as one in which the rights asserted are
"several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action.
'3 72
As in a true class action, there exists a mutuality of interest in the
subject matter of the suit, but the various rights and liabilities of
the class members are not joint or common but characteristically
several.37 3 For this reason the representatives of a hybrid class
in effect assert their individual rights while seeking a relief which
favors the entire class.3 74 Though not readily apparant from the
given definition of a hybrid action, it is normally addressed to the
presence of property which calls for distribution or manage-
D. & C.2d 490 (Dauph. C.P. 1956). Cf. Alexander v. Kephart, 10 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 559, A.2d (1973).
366. See Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182, 282 A.2d 714 (1971); Sha-
piro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 210 A.2d 890 (1965). Such actions in Penn-
sylvania are also subject to the provisions of P.R.C.P. 1506 and 1508.
367. See Jones v. Gillespie, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (Phila. C.P. 1973);
Stansbury v. School Dist. of Chester, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (Ches. C.P.
1970); Lackey v. Sacoolas, 57 Lanc. Co. L. Rev. 397 (Pa. C.P. 1961), aff'd,
411 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963). See generally In re Pittsburgh Press,
4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
368. See Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 301 A.2d
93 (1973).
369. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Central Republic Trust Co.,
11 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1935).
370. See California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd in part
o n other grounds sub nom., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
371. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 234 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.
La. 1964).
372. See note 24 supra. Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513,
516 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7
Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C.
212 (Mercer C.P. 1952).
373. See generally Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513, 516
(Alleg. C.P. 1956); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa.
D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212
(Mercer C.P. 1952).
374. See Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952) (dic-
tum). See generally Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
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ment.3 75 It is the common interest in this specific property which
constitutes the foundation of a hybrid class. 370 This class form
is best exemplified by a creditor's action in which the representa-
tive creditor, on behalf of a class of creditors with individual
claims, seeks to have a receiver appointed for a corporate debtor
with eventual liquidation and distribution of the property ap-
pointed to the custody of the court.3 7 Insofar as the hybrid class
action affects specific property it constitutes an in rem proceeding
and, given the fact that it normally addresses receivership and
liquidation, is outside the scope of an action in law.38
In Pennsylvania it appears that no hybrid class actions have
been successfully prosecuted pursuant to Rule 2230,37 although
there were a number of such actions presented to the federal
courts under the 1938 Rule, most often in the context of an action
for a receiver. 3 0 Nevertheless, the appointment of a receiver is not
subject to statutory regulation in Pennsylvania and therefore re-
mains a proper subject for the hybrid action.
38 1
Perhaps the most controversial and troublesome of the class
action categories is the "spurious" class. It is uniformly defined
as one in which the rights involved are "several, and there is a
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
a common relief is sought."3 2  This class form is appropriately
375. See generally Martinez v. Maverick County Water Control and
Improvement Dist., 219 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1955); Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 123
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
376. See generally Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp.
763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
377. See Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956) (dictum); Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C.
212 (Mercer C.P. 1952) (dictum). See generally Dickinson v. Burnham,
197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
378. See generally Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
379. However, one lower court case did have certain hybrid action
characteristics. See Farrel v. Livingston Apts. Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C. 280
(Leh. C.P. 1951).
380. See note 377 supra.
381. See MOORE, § 23.09; PA. EQuIrY 1533. See generally McDougal v.
Huntingdon & Broad Top Mountain R.R., 294 Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928).
382. See note 24 supra; Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology,
77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 319 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Federation of Salaried Unions v.
Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Callen v. Callen,
83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952) (tenants in common are not the
proper subject for a class action). A form of spurious class action was
recognized in Pennsylvania prior to the enactment of P.R.C.P. 2230. See
Commonwealth v. Susquehanna & Del. River R.R., 122 Pa. 306 (188B);
deemed "spurious" because the rights or liabilities asserted are
neither identical nor common. 8 53 Moreover there is no commonal-
ity of interest in any specific property as is the case in a hybrid ac-
tion. The class is permitted simply because the individual rights
and liabilities, although several,8 4 are founded upon a common
factual background or question of law. s5 The relief sought by a
spurious class, whether an injunction or damages, must be com-
mon to the class in the sense that one member cannot seek dam-
ages while another seeks injunctive relief.
8 0
The spurious class action is conceptually related to the per-
missive joinder of parties rule which permits persons to join as
plaintiffs in a common action when their claims arise out of the
same transaction and a common question of law or fact is in-
volved.38 7 Consequently, the spurious action is said to constitute
no more than a permission to such persons to sue as a class or to
Conm_nnnnwea1th v. LeFevre. 27 Pa. 413 (1856). But see Aldrich v. Big Run
Water Co., 66 Pitts. L.J. 325 (Pa. C.P. 1918). See generally Kainz v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
383. See Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956) (substantial identity of interest will suffice).
Cf. Charles v. Crestview Properties, Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph.
C.P. 1957). See generally Knudsen v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 106
F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Il. 1952).
384. It has not been determined by case law whether there is a dif-
ference between "several" and "separate" rights as those terms are used
in the definition of the spurious class. However these terms are distin-
guishable when applied to P.R.C.P. 2229(a). In Eichilberger v. Warner
West Corp., 38 Del. Co. Rep. 369 (Pa. C.P. 1951), the court interpreted
"separate" as meaning each cause of action or right was totally independ-
ent of the others. "Thus where each of a number of persons make an
individual contract of employment with a contractor, each person has a
separate right and in event of breach, each has a separate cause of action.
In the case of "several" causes of action, the rights upon which they are
based arise from the same contract or transaction, as in the case where
several persons enter into a contract with a contractor under the terms
of which each has an individual right. Such rights and the causes of action
arising upon their breach are termed "several" as distinguished from
"joint" rights on the one hand and "separate" rights on the other." Id.
at 370-71.
385. See Sipe v. Pohland Bros., 51 West. Co. L.J. 125 (Pa. C.P. 1966);
Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 319
(Pa. C.P. 1961); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D.
& C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). See generally Harris v. Palm Springs Al-
pine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co.,
125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
386. See generally Goldstein v. North Jersey Trust Co., 39 F.R.D. 363
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
387. PA. R. Civ. P. 2229 (a):
Persons may join as plaintiffs who assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, separately or on the alternative, in respect of
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrence if any common question of law or fact
affecting the rights to relief of all such persons will arise in the
action.
The spurious class action under the 1938 federal rule was similarly
related to the federal permissive joinder rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 20. See gen-
erally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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join such a group as defendants. 38 8 Given this fact, it has been al-
ternately labelled a "representative joinder"389 or merely an "in-
vitation to joinder."390 Moreover, the spurious class action and the
permissive joinder rule are both founded upon similar grounds of
convenience-to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to prevent the
undesirable situation of inconsistent verdicts by different juries.3 91
Pennsylvania has long been regarded as a "safe harbour" for
the spurious class action as evidenced by the number of lower
court cases in which it has been recognized.3 9 2 The wisdom of
such holdings is not above criticism, however, for it is certainly
open to question whether such an action is properly maintainable
under a procedural rule that lacks the confirming statutory lan-
guage which fostered the spurious class action under the 1938
rule.3 93 As previously mentioned, one of the essential prerequis-
ites to the maintenance of a class action in Pennsylvania is a com-
monality of interest.3 94 Though this commonality of interest is
readily apparent in the true and hybrid actions it appears to be
totally lacking in the spurious action. It involves neither the com-
mon right nor common interest in specific property which consti-
tute the underpinnings of the true and hybrid actions. In addi-
tion, Rule 2230 requires the class representative to adequately rep-
resent the interests of all class members 9 5 and for this reason
the courts have faithfully scrutinized the adequacy of representa-
tion in the true and hybrid actions; 96 however, they have consist-
ently overlooked this issue in spurious actions, because a judgment
in a spurious action binds only the class representatives and not
388. See Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 77 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 319 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Charles v. Crestview Properties Inc., 15 Pa. D.
& C.2d 568 (Dauph. C.P. 1957); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westing-
house, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956).
389. Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212, 214 (Mercer C.P. 1952). See
also Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281
(Alleg. C.P. 1956) (the spurious action accomplishes no more than an order
by the trial judge which consolidates a number of cases for trial).
390. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 23 F.R.D. 264, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
391. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197, 200 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
Cf. Montgomery Township Citizens Ass'n. v. Montgomery Township School
Dist., 3 Adams Co. L.J. 15 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Fleishmann's Vienna Bakery
v. Torquato, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 490 (Dauph. C.P. 1956). See generally AN-
DERSON § 2230.7.
392. See generally J. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action; Considera-
tions of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REv. 407, 487 (1969).
393. See note 24 supra.
394. See note 262 supra.
395. See note 275 and accompanying text supra.
396. See note 424 and accompanying text infra.
the class members. 97 This lack of common interest and adequate
representation may well justify the conclusion that the spurious
action is not a proper class action under Rule 2230 but rather a pro-
cedural device permitted under a liberal interpretation of the Per-
missive Joinder Rule.3
98
The fact remains that the spurious action is given recogni-
tion as a class action under Rule 2230, although the similarity of
function between the Permissive Joinder Rule and the spurious
class action has resulted in some confusion in Pennsylvania's lower
courts regarding the appropriate application of each. 99 For ex-
ample, in Korona v. Bensalem Township,400 the court surmised
that because the parties plaintiff could have joined purusant to
P.R.C.P. 2229(a) they should also be permitted to constitute a
spurious class under Rule 2230, thereby implying that these pro-
cedural devices are coextensive and could be used interchangeably
or at the parties option or election. 401 Although the court was cor-
rect in concluding that both procedural devices serve asimilar
function, so long as it insists on recognizing a distinio- n t.cc-
the two it should follow the mandate contained in Rule 2230 and
permit the class action device only when "impracticable" to join
the parties.40 2 The use of either device should more properly be a
function of the class size-only when joinder becomes impracic-
able should the spurious class suit be permitted.
40
3
397. See Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). "In as much as persons who do not become
parties cannot be affected by the decision, we need not go further as to
the adequacy of plaintiff's representation of the others in the class." Id.
at 287. But see Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
See generally Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966).
398. This conclusion is reinforced by the holding of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 385 Pa. 293, 122 A.2d
688 (1956), wherein the court summarily dismissed the contention that a
purported spurious class was properly constituted under Rule 2230 by stat-
ing that "the rights of the various plaintiffs as the several grantees of lots
by deeds from the individual defendants are not such common interests
as are necessary to justify a class action." Id. at 287, 122 A.2d at 689.
See also Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Alleg.
C.P. 1958), aff'd, 396 Pa. 279, 152 A.2d 682 (1959). Despite this holding,
a number of Pennsylvania's lower courts have recognized a spurious class
action on virtually identical facts as those in Korona. See Jones v. Zim-
merman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Charles v. Crestview Prop-
erties, Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph. C.P. 1957).
399. See generally ANDERSON § 2230.7 (The spurious class action and
the Permissive Joinder Rule constitute a "procedural duplication").
400. 5 Bucns Co. L. Rep. 142 (Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd, 385 Pa. 283, 122
A.2d 688 (1956).
401. "[I]t was optional in limine either for all the members of the
class to join as plaintiffs under P.R.C.P. 2229(a) or for certain members
of the class to bring an action on behalf of the class under P.R.C.P. 2230."
Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 142, 155 (Pa. C.P.
1955). Cf. Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956) (based action on both 2229 (a) and 2230).
402. See note 20 supra.
403. See Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer C.P. 1952);
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Although established that class actions may be maintained
both at law and in equity,404 the spurious class action has nor-
mally been employed and recognized in equitable actions.40 5 It has
on limited occasions, however, been maintained in law for dam-
ages. 40 6 Nevertheless, this latter application of the spurious class
form has met strong resistence in a number of federal and state
,courts which have categorically refused to permit a spurious class
action to be maintained at law for the recovery of money dam-
ages. 407 Their refusal is based in part upon the recognition that a
judgment in a spurious class action is of limited res judicata effect
and therefore does not preclude the initiation of subsequent suits
by the class members who did not join or intervene in the original
proceedings. 40 8 In Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co.,40 9 the court in in-
terpreting the effect to be given a spurious action under Rule 2230
cited the general principle that a court could not adjudicate the
separate claims of parties in an action at law to which they have
not joined and therefore concluded that Rule 2230 does not em-
power the class representative to sue as a "trustee" for all the class
Beauty Hall Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 319 (Pa.
C.P. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 418 Pa. 221, 210 A.2d 264 (1965). Cf.
Straw v. Borough of Lake City, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (Erie C.P. 1962).
404. See note 254 supra.
405. See, e.g., Beauty Hall, Inc. V. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 77 Dauph.
Co. Rep. 319 (Pa. C.P. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 418 Pa. 221, 210 A.2d
264 (1965); Korona v. Township of Bensalem, 5 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 142
(Pa. C.P. 1955), rev'd, 385 Pa. 283, 122 A.2d 688 (1956). Cf. Farrel v. Liv-
ingston Apts., Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C. 280 (Leh. C.P. 1951); Speizer v. McDow-
ell Nat'l Bank, 5 Mercer Co. L.J. 234 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
406. See, e.g., Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P.
1967); Charles v. Crestview Properties Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph.
C.P. 1957); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). Cf. Huyett v. City of Reading, 57 Berks Co. L.J.
73 (Pa. C.P. 1965); Fabiankovitz v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 81 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 216 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Sipe v. Pohland Bros. Building and Lumber Co.,
Inc., 51 West. Co. L.J. 125 (Pa. C.P. 1956). See generally Independence
Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939); Kainz v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
407. See, e.g., Glass v. Dean Coal Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 657 (Camb.
C.P. 1956); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949). See generally Fawkes v. Dravo Corp., 62 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa.
1945); Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 735
(N.D. Iowa 1942).
408. See, e.g., Glass v. Dean Coal Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 657 (Camb.
C.P. 1956); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949). Additional problems include the representatives proof of damages
suffered by individual class members and the effect to be given a judgment
if the representative recovers for the entire class. See generally GooDRIcH-
AMRAM § 2230 (a) -7.
409. 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949).
members and collect a judgment in excess of his personal inter-
est.
4 10
Nevertheless, a few of Pennsylvania's courts have permitted a
spurious class action to be maintained in law for damages. In
Charles v. Crestview Properties Inc.
41 1 and Jones v. Zimmerman,412
spurious class actions were instituted by a number of homeowners
in real estate developments to recover from the developers amounts
sufficient to pave the streets which were improperly paved by the
developers. The developers filed preliminary objections to the
maintenance of the class actions at law. In dismissing the prelim-
inary objections both courts acknowledged the oft-cited proposi-
tion that the spurious action could not be maintained at law for
damages, but determined that in the cases before them specific
performance was not an appropriate remedy and that money dam-
ages would be appropriate where the recovery would inure to the
common benefit of the class and the class representatives could,
upon obtaining the full recovery, be responsible to the class mem-
bers for the performance of the developers promise under the in-
dividual contracts.
Although the decision in Charles and Jones may prompt one
to conclude that spurious class actions at law are now generally
recognized in Pennsylvania, such a conclusion must be approached
with caution. In both cases the rights asserted were individual
or several, ostensibly entitling each homeowner to his individual
damages, but the recoveries sought were to inure to the benefit
of the class as a whole. In applying their recovery to the paving
of the streets they would, in effect, accomplish no more than an
order by a court of equity compelling specific performance by the
developers of their breached contracts. Furthermore, the nature
of the recovery made unnecessary the determination or allocation
of individual damage recoveries, and the classes were small enough
that the individual members could be given notice of the pending
action and its effect on their rights should the court choose to do
so. Therefore, the holds in Jones and Charles may, in the future,
be limited to their facts and serve as authority only in cases where
the class size and recovery sought are similar to those in the pre-
ceding cases.
413
410. In a real (true or hybrid) class action, representation is prac-
ticable because the representative plaintiffs have only an indirect
interest in the litigation and do not themselves receive the pro-
ceeds of the litigation, which flows into the hands of an unincor-
porated association, a trustee, a corporation, and so forth. In our
case whether or not several members of the group or class may
institute the action for all, they clearly have no authority to ob-
tain, collect, or satisfy a judgment except to the extent of their
personal interest therein.
Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150, 155 (Leh. C.P. 1949).
411. 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (Dauph. C.P. 1957).
412. 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
413. See note 398 supra.
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This conclusion is given further impetus by the holding in
Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse414 wherein a number
of salaried employees of the defendant corporation instituted a
class action in assumpsit, later determined to be spurious in form,
against the corporate defendant to recover their individual over-
time wages. Although the court dismissed the defendants pre-
liminary objections to the class action and affirmed the right
of the employees to bring the spurious action at law, it went on
to rule that only the individual plaintiffs and those who later
join or intervene in the action would be permitted to recover the
amounts owed each. 415 This ruling appears to more closely con-
form to the holdings in the federal courts under the 1938 Rule and
probably reflects the present status of the spurious class action
at law for damages in Pennsylvania.
F. Res Judicata Effect of Judgments
In drafting the 1938 federal class action rule, the federal rules
committee did not address the effect to be given a judgment in a
class suit for the reason that they regarded this subject a matter
of substance and not procedure. 416 The Pennsylvania Rules Com-
mittee apparently took a similar view when drafting Rule 2230.
The first courts to address this issue were compelled to balance the
constitutional principles of due process, which generally preclude
a judgment from binding an individual who is not a party to the
suit, with the stated purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of actions
through the class action device. 417 Pennsylvania's courts have been
no less troubled by these constitutional issues and have, with cer-
tain exceptions, refused to bind class members not made a party
to the suit.
4 18
414. 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956).
415. Id. at 288. Cf. Buszinski v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 107 Pitts. L.J. 360
(Pa. C.P. 1959).
416. See generally Gart v. Cole, 236 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959); Moore,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Some Problems Raised by the Prelimi-
nary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 557, 570-76 (1937).
417. The effect to be given a judgment under the federal rule had to
comport with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Dickin-
son v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952). State court class actions
adjudications were subject to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
418. See, e.g., Buzinski v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 107 Pitts. L.J. 360 (Pa.
C.P. 1959); Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513 (Mercer C.P. 1952);
Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). But
see Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967) wherein
the court mistakenly stated with reference to class actions generally that
"the judgment in the action is a binding adjudication as to all members
of the class. . . ." Id. at 201.
The effect, if any, of a judgment in a class action upon non-
participating class members varies with the type of class action
asserted. There is, however, one proposition which never varies-
the nonparticipating class members can under no circumstances
be subjected to personal liability by a judgment in the action.
419
This latter proscription has an obvious effect upon the utility of
the class action device in suits involving a defendant class. Irrespec-
tive of the proscription against liability, there is one blanket excep-
tion to the rule against binding judgments. In a true class action,
and in some respects a hybrid action, absent any collusion or fraud,
a judicial determination is binding or res judicata as to all the class
members. 420 The constitutional prohibitions have been turned aside
or satisfied in the true class action because it appears to be the only
class form which lends itself to true representative pleading.
4 21
The class representatives interests in the litigation is not personal
but held in common with the class and the relief sought does not
benefit the representative individually but inures to the entire
class.4 22 Moreover, the true clas acution has been looked upon as
a "public rights suit," as evidenced by the taxpayers actions and
suits to enjoin discriminatory or unconstitutional practices, and as
such public policy favors finality of the issue.
423
The necessity for the strict rule regarding the adequacy of rep-
resentation in a true class action 424 becomes immediately apparent
when considered in conjunction with the res judicata effect given a
judgment in this form of class action. As a result, if it is found
that the class representative was negligent or incompetent or oth-
erwise did not adequately represent the class, the judgment should
not be given res judicata effect as to the absent class members.
42 5
Although intervention by class members is normally not warranted
in a true class action,426 it has been permitted in cases where the
purported intervenor has made a strong showing of inadequate
419. See note 20 supra. This proscription was adopted from the former
PA. EQUITY R. 16.
420. See Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513, 515 (Alleg. C.P.
1956); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949).
See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Sovereign Camp,
W.D.W. v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1968); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921).
421. See Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949).
422. See note 353 and accompanying text supra.
423. See MooRE § 23.11.
424. See, e.g., Penn Galvanizing Co. v. Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 370, 130
A.2d 511 (1957).
425. See generally Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 361 U.S.
683 (1961). "The judgment in a class action will bind only those members
of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by existing
parties to the litigation. . . ." Id. at 691.
426. See note 448 infra.
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representation on the part of the representative. 427 Furthermore,
while notice to the class members is a matter within the discre-
tion of the court 428 and is generally not directed in true class ac-
tions, 429 it has been suggested that such a requirement may be
helpful to the court in determining the adequacy of the represen-
tation by permitting the class members to voice their objections in
this regard.43 0
The res judicata effect to be given a judgment in a hybrid
class action is of a dual nature. Insofar as the several rights are as-
serted against the corporate debtor in personam, the claims of the
nonjoining or nonintervening parties are not cut off by the judg-
ment and they may later initiate separate actions based on their
several claims, 431 however, insofar as the action operates as an
in rem proceeding to liquidate and distribute the debtors property
within the custody of the court, a judgment is res judicata as to
all claims against that property. 43 2 Although the nonparticipating
parties retain their individual claims gainst the corporate debtor
this right may, in the final analysis, be of little value in that the
corporate debtor is generally no more than "an empty shell" after
the appointment of a receiver for liquidation and distribution.
433
Given this fact, the courts addressing hybrid actions have often
exercised their discretion by requiring that notice be given the
absent class members in order that they may present their claims
prior to liquidation and distribution of the corporate property.
43 4
Because the res judicata effect to be given a judgment in
a hybrid action is of limited scope, the courts tend to be more
permissive with regard to the adequacy of representation in such
cases. 43 5 Intervention by class members may also be granted, espe-
427. See generally Herbst v. Able, 45 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
6 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
428. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
429. See generally ANDERSON § 2230.18.
430. Cf. Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 197 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
See generally York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
431. See generally Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
432. Id. See also Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150
(Leh. C.P. 1949). It should be noted in this regard that the courts have
uniformly given notice to all possible claimants to file their claims to the
funds administered by the court. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d
973 (2d Cir. 1952).
433. See generally MOORE § 23.12.
434. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
435. See Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). See generally Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125
F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
cially in those instances where the courts order notification to the
absent class members of their right to intervene and present their
claims prior to liquidation and distribution of debtor property. 436
As alluded to earlier in this article, a judgment in a spurious
class action is generally res judicata only as to the representa-
tives, those in privity with the representatives, and all who have in-
tervened in the action.437 Therefore, the spurious class action is
not a class suit functionally but rather a liberal application of the
permissive joinder device and serves merely as an invitation to
joinder or intervention which may or may not be accepted.43 8 The
constitutional objections to a contrary holding are manifest and
have been espoused at length by a number of Pennsylvania
courts. 439  For this reason the adequacy of representation in a
spurious class action is of little concern to the courts and inter-
vention is liberally permitted. 4 0 However, it is arguable that be-
cause the absent class member will nevertheless be subject to the
principle of stare decisis which underlies all judgments, the courts
would be warranted in devoting more attention to the represen-
tation question.
441
G. Intervention, Independent Action, and Statute of Limitations
Although constant reference has been made to an absent class
member's right to intervene in the class action or initiate a sepa-
rate and independent action, it remains difficult to catalogue the
Pennsylvania cases in this regard. There is a paucity of Pennsyl-
vania case law considering these issues and in those the issue was
generally only a tangential consideration. Nevertheless, a number
of general conclusions may be formulated.
Intervention in Pennsylvania class actions must conform to
the procedural rules applicable to intervention in general. 442
Therefore, in concept at least, any class member not a record party
to the class action may intervene at any time during the pendency
of the action if he could have joined as an original party in the ac-
tion or could have been joined.443 It is generally immaterial wheth-
436. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
437. See Buszinski v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 107 Pitts. L.J. 360 (Pa. C.P.
1959); Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 510 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Fed-
eration of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg.
C.P. 1956). See generally Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966).
438. See note 398 and accompanying text supra.
439. See note 407 supra.
440. See Charles v. Crestview Properties Inc., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568
(Dauph. C.P. 1957); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa.
D. & C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956). See generally Polakoff v. Delaware
Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 259 F. Supp. 574 (D. Del. 1966).
441. See Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Low Niernberg Corp., 23
F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
442. See ANDERSON § 2230.19; GOODRICH-AMRAM § 2230(a)-4. See gen-
erafly PA. R. Civ. P. 2326-50.
443. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2327 (3). See also Taged, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
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er the intervention is before or after trial, so long as before final
judgment.444 Where intervention is permitted, however, the inter-
venor must contribute to the costs of litigation and the amount is not
limited only to the costs accruing subsequent to intervention. 445
It should also be noted that intervention may be disallowed by the
court when it is of the opinion that the petitioner has unduly de-
layed in making application for intervention, 446 or when it is shown
that the intervenor is in fact adequately represented by the rec-
ord parties.
447
As may be gleaned from earlier discussions, intervention is
normally not warranted in true class actions where the interests
of the class members are adequately represented by the record
parties. 448 A similar conclusion is reached in hybrid actions, even
though the representation may not be of the quality found in a
true class action, because the absent creditor will normally be
permitted to later file his claim in the proceeding, although not
bound to do so.449 Intervention has been liberally permitted in the
spurious class action because there is, in effect, no true represen-
tation by the class representative who is precluded from adjudi-
cating the rights of the absent class members.450 Moreover, absent
class members must intervene in the action should they desire to
of Adjustment, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 331, 295 A.2d 339 (1972) (the
intervenor shall have all the rights and liabilities of a party to an action);
Universal Builders Supply v. Brown, 109 Pitts. L.J. 435 (Pa. C.P. 1961);
Verona Construction Co. v. Township of Lower Merion, 84 Montg. Co. L.
Rep. 400 (Pa. C.P. 1965); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C.
150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). See generally GOODRIcH-AMRAM § 2230 (a)-4.
444. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2327(3). See generally Taged, Inc. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 331, 295 A.2d 339 (1972).
445. See Johnson v. Markle Paper Co., 153 Pa. 189, 25 A. 560 (1893);
Taged, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 331,
295 A.2d 339 (1972); Furguson v. Bole, 168 Pa. Super. 305, 77 A.2d 711
(1951). Cf. Kershaw v. Township of Upper Merion, 83 Montg. Co. L. Rep.
194 (Pa. C.P. 1964) (intervention in purported class action refused though
intervenor contributed to costs).
446. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2329(3). See also Esso Standard Oil Co. v.
Taylor, 399 Pa. 324, 159 A.2d 692 (1960); Howell v. Franke, 393 Pa. 440,
143 A.2d 10 (1958); Robinson Township School Dist. v. Houghton, 387 Pa.
236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956).
447. See Film Marketing Services, Inc. v. Homer Photo Labs, 425 Pa.
409, 229 A.2d 573 (1967); Berman v. Duggan, 119 Pitts. L.J. 226 (Pa. C.P.
1971).
448. See generally ANDERSON § 2230.20; Bachrach v. General Inv.
Crop., 29 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
449. See generally ANDERsoN § 2230.20.
450. See Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. &
C.2d 281 (Alleg. C.P. 1956); Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. &
C. 150 (Leh. C.P. 1949). Cf. Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212 (Mercer
C.P. 1952).
participate in the recovery. Intervention in a spurious class action
has been denied, however, when the intervenors claim would raise
complicated issues which are better suited to an individual hear-
ing.4 11 There is also some question as to how long the members of
a spurious class can wait before deciding to intervene. Obviously
the members would prefer to wait until the conclusion of the trial
and then intervene before judgment if the trial appeared to be fa-
vorable on the merits. The present discord on this issue is aptly il-
lustrated by two Pennsylvania lower court decisions. Whereas one
court determined that the spurious class action would bind only
"those who are parties by appearance either originally or by being
added to the record thereafter," 452 another court declared that he
action would bind "original parties and those who will be added
as parties before trial."453
There remains the additional question whether the nonparti-
cipating class members may later intervene in a class action ini-
tiated just prior to the expiration of the applicable status of limi-
tations. Although there has been no definitive statement by
Pennsylvania's courts, the federal courts were of the opinion that
the absent members should be permitted to intervene after the
passing of the statute of limitations.4 54 They reached this conclu-
sion by analyzing the class action within the framework of estab-
lished agency principles and analogizing the class representative
to an "agent" who, by initiating a suit prior to the passing of a stat-
ute of limitations, bars that statute's application to later interven-
tion by his "principles" or class members. 455 This rationale has
been subjected to criticism for failing to recognize the fundamen-
tal distinction between the class action categories. Although the
true, and to a lesser degree the hybrid, class actions may appropri-
ately be considered representative actions, the spurious class action
is by definition not amenable to such a description. In the spuri-
ous action the class representative is simply asserting his individual
claim or right and merely inviting others to join if they so desire.
Given this fact, it is highly unlikely that agency principles are at
all appropriate to spurious class action analysis, 45 6 and the class
members right to intervene should, therefore, be barred if petition
is made subsequent to the running of the statute.
451
451. See generally MOORE § 23.13; Keavy v. Anthony, 2 F.R.D. 19
(D.R.I. 1941).
452. Charles v. Crestview, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568, 574 (Dauph. C.P.
1957).
453. Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
281, 287 (Alleg. C.P. 1956).
454. See, e.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
455. See generally GOODIcT-AMRAM § 2230(a) -4.
456. Id.
457. See Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949); Sipe v. Pohland Bros. Building & Lumber Co., 51 West. Co. L.J.
125 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
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Closely related to the intervention question is the right of a
class member, not a party of record, to bring an action independent
of the class action in which he is purportedly being represented.
Again, Pennsylvania's position with regard to this matter remains
uncertain due to the dearth of case law addressing the issue. How-
ever, a number of procedural authorities have espoused the view
that this right should be correlative with the right of the class
member to intervene in the class action proceedings. 458 Therefore,
the right of a nonparticipating class member to initiate an inde-
pendent action would remain a function of the type of class to
which he is a member. Accordingly, a member of a true class
whose interests are fully represented by the parties of record is
neither entitled to intervene in the class action proceedings nor
institute an independent action in his own behalf during the pen-
dency of the proceedings. 4 9 To the opposite effect, a member of a
spurious class whose interests are not fully represented and who
is not bound by the outcome of the proceedings would be free to
either intervene in the pending action or initiate an independent
action based on his individual rights. 460 The right of a class mem-
ber in a hybrid action lies somewhere between these antipodes but
remains uncertain, although there is a federal authority to the ef-
fect that independent actions by members of a hybrid class will be
enjoined, at least when they have been given notice of the class
action and the opportunity to share in the recovery procured.
48 1
H. Voluntary Termination or Settlement of a Class Action
Rule 2230(b) dictates that a class action may not be dismissed,
discontinued, or compromised, nor a voluntary nonsuit entered by
or against a class, without the prior approval of the court in
which the action is pending. 462 This restriction on the rights of
the record parties or class representatives was imposed in or-
der to protect the interests of the class, on whose behalf the action
was initiated, from prejudicial and binding action by their repre-
sentatives.463 The court approval addressed in Rule 2230(b) is
mandatory, and although compromise and settlement have histor-
ically been favored by the courts, it is left to the courts' discretion
to consider the wisdom and sufficiency of the settlement or com-
458. See ANDERSON § 2230.21; GOODRIcH-AMRAM § 2230(a)-5.
459. Id.
460. See Guter v. Donaldson Iron Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Leh. C.P.
1949). See generally Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
461. See Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
462. See note 20 supra. See generally RULES COMMITTEE NOTE to PA.
R. Civ. P. 229.
463. See RULES COMMITTEE NOTE to PA. R. Crv. P. 2230; Shapiro v. Mag-
promise proposal. 46 4 In this regard the burden is on the pro-
ponents of the compromise or settlement to satisfy the court that
it is fair and reasonable and not prejudicial to the interests of the
absent class members.
465
Few Pennsylvania courts have been confronted with voluntary
termination issues and for this reason one is inclined to look to the
federal experience for guidance. However, this approach must be
taken with caution because the correlative provision under the 1938
Federal Rule differs from Rule 2230(b) in the matter of notice re-
quirements. Whereas Pennsylvania's class action rule makes no
provision for notice to the class of the proposed compromise or
settlement, ostensibly leaving the matter within the court's discre-
tion, its federal counterpart mandated notice to the class before
the settlement of a true class action while making notice optional
in hybrid or spurious actions.
466
In exercising their discretion the courts must take cognizance
of the effect to be given a determination in the type of class action
present. In the true class action, and in some respects the hybrid
action, the rights of the nonjoined members will be affected by
court's decision, including an order which approves a compromise
settlement, under the board res judicata principles applicable to
those class forms. 46 Therefore, a settlement compromise or termi-
nation proposal in such actions is deserving of strict scrutiny and
should only be approved if advantageous to the entire class. 468
The lack of any mandatory notice provision in Rule 2230(b) gives
further impetus to this conclusion, although the court would be
fully warranted in exercising its discretion in favor of such a re-
quirement where possible as an aid in evaluating the proposal
and avoiding subsequent procedural due process questions.469
aziner, 418 Pa. 278, 210 A.2d 898 (1965) (court not empowered to condition
its approval upon payment of counsel fees by the class representative).
464. See generally Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.
1946); Kershaw v. Township of Upper Merion, 83 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 194
(Pa. C.P. 1964).
465. See Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513 (Alleg. C.P. 1955).
Though P.R.C.P. 2230(b) does not prescribe the procedure for soliciting
the required court approval, this case establishes the use of a petition for
that purpose. See generally Norman v. Kiefe, 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Pesta v. Barron, 185 Pa. Super. 323, 138 A.2d 690 (1958) (petition
and notice to all parties).
466. See note 24 supra. For a discussion of the problems inherent in
directing such notice see Birnbaum v. Berrel, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists Ass'n. v. County of Phila-
delphia, 4 F.R.D. 106 (D. Del. 1944).
467. See note 420 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Noonan v. Mc-
Guire, 11 Pa. D, & C.2d 513 (Alleg. C.P. 1955).
468. See generally Martin v. United Standard Oil Fund, 30 F. Supp.
864 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (dismissal not prejudicial to class when insolvent de-
fendant couldn't satisfy any possible judgment); ANDERSON § 2230.24;
GOODRICH-AMRAM § 2230 (b) -1.
469. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 11 Leb. Co. L.J. 391 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
See generally Robbins v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
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However, the court should not permit the termination of a prop-
erly represented class action over the objection of the opposing
party merely because the final judgment would be entered against
or be prejudicial to the class when the defendant has been put to
the expense of litigation and is entitled to a judgment on the merits
of the case;470 nor should the action be terminated over the objec-
tion of interested parties when the petition was the result of collu-
sion between the class representative and the opposing party.471
In contrast to the settlement of true and hybrid actions, a de-
termination by the court in a spurious class action will not have
the same broad res judicata effect on the absent class members
472
and the court should freely permit the termination or settlement of
the action as to the record parties. 473 Moreover, the court is not
empowered to approve a compromise or settlement which would
have res judicata effect as to the entire class and for this reason the
proscriptions contained in Rule 2230(b) are totally inappropriate to
the spurious class action. This conclusion was aptly illustrated by
the holding of the court in Noonan v. McGuire47 4 wherein the rep-
resentatives of a spurious class made up of "unit holders" of a gas
well petitioned the court to approve a compromise settlement of
the amounts owed each from the sale of gas. The representatives
and intervening parties sought not only the approval of the com-
promise as to them but further that it be given binding effect as to
the objecting and nonparticipating class members. In dismissing the
petition the court acknowledged the right of the record parties in a
spurious suit to compromise the dispute as to themselves but
added that only in a true class action did it have the power to ap-
prove a compromise which would bind the nonparticipating mem-
bers.
47 5
Although the restriction on voluntary termination of a class
action appears to be all-encompassing, 476 the federal courts recog-
Delahantz v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 26 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1939).
470. See generally Birnbaum v. Berrel, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
471. See generally Webster v. Eisenlohr, Inc., 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945); Golconda Petroleum Corp. v.
Petrol Corp., 46 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
472. See note 437 and accompanying text supra.
473. See Noonan v. McGuire, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513 (Alleg. C.P. 1955).
Cf. Cissel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 37 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Ky.
1941) (court approved settlement of any type of class action will bind
non-participating members who accept their share of the settlement).
474. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 513 (Alleg. C.P. 1955).
475. Id. at 516.
476. See, e.g., Certain-teed Products Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d
Cir. 1948) (required court approval when compromise effected by a con-
sent decree entered by the court).
nized a number of exceptions to the same proscription contained in
the 1938 rule; those exceptions may influence future questions re-
garding the proper application of Rule 2230(b). Under the old
federal rule court approval was only required for actions pending
in court; a claim could therefore be compromised without court
approval prior to initiation of the class action.477 This conclusion
is obvious insofar as the court has not taken cognizance or jurisdic-
tion over the matter prior to commencement of the class action;
however, it does serve to emphasize the fact that before one at-
tempts to initiate a class action he should consider this restriction
which is not applicable to individual suits, and its possible effect
on any desired compromise or settlement. Additionally, the 1938
Rule was held not to apply to collateral proceedings wherein an at-
tempt was made to have the propriety of a settlement put in is-
sue.478 There was also some authority to the effect that the class
representative could dismiss or compromise the action without
court approval before the intervention of other parties; 479 how-
ever, these rulings have since been discredited by the courts and
procedural authorities and are probably of little efficacy today.480
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly, it is time for Pennsylvania to re-examine its anach-
ronistic civil procedural rule governing class actions. Until
now, no pressing need for such revision was apparent since class
actions have been primarily a federal experience. Sparse Pennsyl-
vania decisional law reflects the prevailing disinclination of poten-
tal class action plaintiffs to resort to state court. Nevertheless,
recent constrictions of access to the federal forum indicate a prob-
able rise in state court class actions. To meet this exigency in a re-
sponsible way, Rule 2230 must be changed.
The manner of the change will reflect a policy decision as to
the appropriate use of the class suit device. If after re-examination
of Rule 2230 the present Pennsylvania policy of promoting only
limited use of the device is to be continued, at least the language
of the rule itself should be redone to more specifically reflect case
law developments. If, on the other hand, the decision is made to
modernize and expand the available uses of the device, a thorough
reconstruction of Rule 2230 along the lines of the 1966 amendments
to the Federal Rule is needed.
477. See generally ANDERSON § 2230.22.
478. See Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 155 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1946).
479. See May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); James v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Ayer v. Kemper, 48 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1931). These rulings were
thought to be influenced by the fact that prior to intervention of another
party the record plaintiff had to bear the cost of the litigation alone arid
for that reason should be free to terminate the action at will. See gen-
erally Mohr & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 321 (1937).
480. See GOODRICH-AmRAm § 2230(b)-1; MOOaE § 23.08.
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And yet, wholesale adoption of the language of amended Rule
23 is not the answer for Pennsylvania. The federal experience of
the last eight years has demonstrated very basic and continuing
difficulties with the amended Rule. Any revision of Rule 2230
must reflect cognizance of these problems since they are elemen-
tary to the concept of the modern class suit.
From an enlightened policy point of view, it is submitted that
the proper choice would be the adoption of a modified version of
amended Federal Rule 23. The class action is truly a remedial
device reflective of the nature of many modern legal wrongs. If
that alternative is selected, the draftsmen will have to reckon with
significant due process considerations, treatment of which is wholly
absent in present Rule 2230.481 There are no extensive provisions
therein for assurance of the class representative's ability to repre-
sent absent members or for notice to absentees because final judg-
ment personally binds no one save the actual parties. In con-
trast, amended Rule 23 provides specific safeguards in these areas
because class action judgments thereunder are res judicata as to
all class members who have neither opted-out nor been ruled out
of the class by the court.
In this context, amended Rule 23 is, for the most part, well-
suited to its purposes and it provides a model for the revision of
Rule 2230. A number of variations should be considered, how-
ever.4 2 Among these are possible changes regarding notice and
the tri-partite division into (b) (1), (b) (2) and (b) (3) categories.
As for the categories, added ease in the administration of a
class suit might be gained by consolidating the present three cate-
gories into one. It has been suggested that, in effect, the three are
really only one since (b) (1) and (b) (2) are "merely special situ-
ations within the broad spectrum of subdivisions (a) and (b)-
(3). ' '41' Undoubtedly, there is little difficulty in envisioning satis-
faction of the added (b) (3) requirements by typical (b) (1) and
(b) (2) actions.
However, these categorizations do serve to make the initial de-
termination of appropriateness of class status somewhat easier.
Their difficulty lies in the effect of classification; the suit is sub-
ject to differing treatment dependent upon the category initially
481. See note 20 supra.
482. Of course, there are also significant problems as to the extent of
state courts ability to bind non-resident class members. For a thoughtful
discussion of related issues, see Comment, Expanding the Impact of State
Court Class Action Adiudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Con-
sum-ers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. AEv. 1002 (1971).
483. Homburger, supra note 15, at 636.
selected. The differences are particularly acute with respect to
the mandatory versus discretionary nature of notice. If all "ap-
propriate" class actions were to be made subject to identical
strictures, thereby limiting the function of this tripartitism to ini-
tial identification for appropriateness purposes, then the adoption
of these three categories in Pennsylvania's new version of Rule 2230
would appear unobjectionable.
Such uniformity of treatment, regardless of initial identifica-
tion category, would be most enhanced by a uniform notice provi-
sion for all class actions. This could be accomplished by placing
with the court the discretion to fashion whatever notice procedure
seems best suited to the case at hand, whether it means no notice
or complete individual notice to all. Arguments that notice rises
to the level of an absolute due process requirement in all class
actions or even in all (b) (3) actions are not persuasive.484 The ad-
mittedly weighty due process considerations inherent in present
day use of the class device would be sufficiently protected by
strict requirements as to the adequacy of representation once the
initial validity of class status is judicially recognized.
Furthermore, the court in its discretion should have the option
of attaching either an opt-out or an opt-in proviso to whatever
form of notice it might order. The opt-out alternative may be ac-
ceptable in certain instances but the history of its use gives cre-
dence to charges of client conscription, barratry, etc.48 5 And opt-in
has already been used successfully in a number of cases. 48 6 This
flexibility should carry over to the issue of payment of notice costs
as well. The presumption that the party seeking class recognition
ought to pay notice costs is a sensible one and should continue;
but it should be subject to the court's discretion to apportion or
assume such costs when appropriate and when necessary to the
continuance of a valid class suit.
Admittedly, these suggestions place a great deal of discretion
in the hands of the state's trial judges. The broad discretion of
federal judges under amended Rule 23 has drawn criticism.
87
Moreover, one writer, who proposed a new class action rule for
New York, suggested that state judges are "stepped in a tradition
generally hostile to class suits. 4 8   Despite these observations, if
the policy decision is made to modernize the use of the class action
in Pennsylvania, this wide discretion is vital. And the combination
484. For discussion of this notice issue, see sources listed in note 145
supra.
485. See note 184 and accompanying text supra.
486. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
577-78 (D. Minn. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
For the argument against opt-in, see Kaplan, supra note 17, at 397-98.
487. Justice Black warned of dangers here when the 1966 amendments
to FED. R. CIv. P. were first offered for Supreme Court approval. See note
82 and accompanying text supra.
488. Homburger, supra note 15, at 643.
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of an express announcement of a policy of expanded class action
use by our supreme court through its Procedural Rules Committee
and Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 126 (requiring liberal
construction of the civil rules) should serve to significantly lessen
any traditional antipathy for the device.
In time, it may become necessary to adopt an entirely new ap-
proach to common question group action in the courts. After
only eight years under amended Rule 23, such a course of action
has been suggested for the federal courts despite the fact that
very few federal class actions have been fully litigated. It may
well be that the passage of time will similarly demonstrate the
inappropriateness of any broadening of Rule 2230. But for now,
with the potential for immediate increased use of the class device
in our state courts, Rule 2230 must either be clarified in its present
form or completely revised so that our courts may responsibly
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